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Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life? 
Allison Orr Larsen* 
Times change.  A statute passed today may seem obsolete tomorrow.  Does 
the Constitution dictate when a law effectively expires?  In Shelby County v. 
Holder, the 2013 decision that invalidated a provision of the Voting Rights Act, 
the Court seems to answer that question in the affirmative.  Although rational 
and constitutional when written, the Court held that the coverage formula of the 
law grew to be irrational over time and was unconstitutional now because it 
bears “no logical relation to the present day.”  This reason for invalidating a 
law is puzzling.  The question answered in Shelby County was not about whether 
Congress had constitutional power to pass the Voting Rights Act.  It was not even 
about whether our understanding of the scope of that power had changed from 
1965 to 2013.  The question was whether the passage of time and changed 
circumstances created a distinct reason to nullify the law. 
In this Article, I label this question one of a “constitutional shelf life.”  The 
plaintiffs in Shelby County were not the first ones to ask for invalidation of an 
unconstitutionally stale law, and they will not be the last.  Indeed, since the 
decision, plaintiffs as varied as marijuana enthusiasts and funeral-home 
directors have cited Shelby County for the claim that the “current burdens” of 
a law “must be justified by current needs.”  The goal of this Article is to track 
the idea of a shelf life across various aspects of constitutional law, to 
demonstrate that the issue arises in far more contexts than one might anticipate, 
and then to offer an approach for principled application. 
“[T]imes change.”1  Those were the words of Justice Kennedy when the 
Supreme Court heard oral argument in Shelby County v. Holder,2 the 2013 
decision that invalidated a key section of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).3  The 
Court found the law’s coverage formula—which determined if a state or local 
government must obtain permission before changing voting laws—to be 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School of Law.  For their 
helpful insights and comments I thank Daryl Levinson, Neal Devins, Mike Klarman, Kim 
Roosevelt, Erwin Chemerinsky, Tim Zick, Caleb Nelson, Dave Douglas, Brianne Gorod, Will 
Baude, James Stern, Tara Grove, Adam Gershowitz, Jeff Bellin, and all of the participants in the 
Constitutional Law Workshop Series at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  For excellent 
research assistance I thank Rebecca Morrow, Joe Castor, Eric Sutton, Nick Guidi, and Mike 
Umberger.  As always, I thank Drew. 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-
96) 2013 WL 6908203, at *35 (“GENERAL VERRILLI: I think the—the formula was—was 
rational and effective in 1965.  The Court upheld it then, it upheld it three more times after that.  
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, the Marshall Plan was very good, too, the Morrill Act, the Northwest 
Ordinance, but times change.”). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
3. Id. at 2631. 
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outdated and unconstitutional.4  The formula was designed to cover jurisdic-
tions most vulnerable to race discrimination.5  The Chief Justice, writing for 
the majority, explained that this part of the law (which was written in 1965, 
revised in 1982, and reauthorized without change by Congress in 20066) was 
based on “decades-old data,” “eradicated practices,” and needed to be 
“updated.”7 
All parties agreed the law was “rational” when written, but the Court 
reasoned that it now ignores developments in racial conditions such that it 
has grown to be irrational and bears “no logical relation to the present day.”8  
Stale factual assumptions in the formula rendered the law unconstitutional 
today even though it was constitutional in the past.9  In the Chief Justice’s 
words, “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current 
needs.”10 
This reason for invalidating a law is puzzling.  Adjusting for changed 
circumstances when interpreting the Constitution is nothing new—indeed, 
that argument is basically as old as the Constitution itself.  John Marshall 
wrote that a Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”11  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes said the Constitution must be interpreted in light of “what 
this country has become.”12 
But the Shelby County Court answered a question different from the one 
asked by these jurists.  Much ink has been spilled on the theoretical question 
in constitutional law: when do changed facts (or a changed “understanding 
of the facts”13) alter the way we interpret the Constitution?14  When does the 
 
4. Id.  The coverage formula is found in § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act.  Voting Rights Act of 
1965 § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012), invalidated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013). 
5. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625. 
6. Id. at 2619–21. 
7. Id. at 2627, 2629. 
8. Id. at 2625, 2629. 
9. To be sure, the nature of the constitutional violation in Shelby County is also wrapped up in 
notions of federalism and “equal sovereignty” of the states.  Id. at 2623.  But whatever work 
federalism notions are doing in the decision, they cannot explain the statute’s ultimate invalidation.  
Put differently, the federalism injury was not enough to invalidate the law in 1965 or 1972 or 1982 
but only after the passage of time “in light of current conditions” and because “[o]ur country has 
changed.”  Id. at 2627, 2631. 
10. Id. at 2619 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., writing for the Court on the same subject)). 
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted). 
12. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). 
14. For an interesting series of articles from Lawrence Lessig considering this question, see 
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1169–71 (1993) (arguing that 
changes in the way the Constitution is interpreted may often bring its interpretation closer to an 
original or textual understanding); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396 (1995) (arguing that changed readings of the Constitution 
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meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, change to forbid 
racially segregated schools or bans on gay marriage?  The question I will 
address in this Article is a different one: whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a statute that was constitutional at the time of enactment might 
become unconstitutional over time—not because the prevailing under-
standing of the Constitution has changed but simply because things in the 
world around us have changed.15 
The question answered in Shelby County was not whether Congress had 
constitutional power to pass the Voting Rights Act.16  It was not even about 
whether our understanding of the scope of that power had changed from 1965 
to 2013.  The question was whether the passage of time and changed circum-
stances created a distinct reason to invalidate the law—rendering it obsolete 
and effectively expired. 
The concept I use as shorthand for this question is the prospect of a 
“constitutional shelf life.”17  The goal of this Article is to track this idea of a 
shelf life across various aspects of constitutional law, to demonstrate that the 
issue arises in far more contexts than one might anticipate, and then to 
consider whether it is a concept capable of principled application. 
 
are not always changes of infidelity to its original meaning); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and 
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997) (asserting that “understanding how changed 
readings can be readings of fidelity depends upon understanding how the constraints of context 
matter in a theory of interpretive fidelity”).  For other views on the subject, see generally ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (criticizing the 
notion of an evolving Constitution and celebrating textualism); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning has and must change as time 
passes). 
15. For helpful elaboration on the difference between discerning constitutional meaning and 
applying constitutional doctrine, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 9–13 (2004).  Berman identifies a growing branch of constitutional scholarship that focuses 
not on what any provision of the Constitution “means,” but rather on what he calls “constitutional 
decision rules”—rules that establish how that meaning should be applied in constitutional 
adjudication.  Id. at 9.  The subject of this Article is an example of the latter. 
16. This question on the scope of Congressional power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments was briefed in the case, of course, but was not the route ultimately taken by the 
majority.  See Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes 
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 814 (2014) (explaining that the Court declined to apply the “congru-
ence and proportionality test” as was expected, opting instead to find the provision “irrational”); 
Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 
381 (2014) (noting that the Court failed to explain why Congress had the authority to reauthorize 
§ 5 but not § 4(b)). 
17. I recognize, of course, that the concept of a “shelf life” is not a perfect analogy.  The notion 
of expiration may imply that the law is doomed from the start, which is not the case.  But just like 
food becomes perishable because of the arrival of bacteria, I ask in this Article whether a law can 
meet its end because of external changes that destabilize its premise over time.  For a very different 
take on this question and an example of someone who does not think laws can have a constitutional 
shelf life, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 
1279 (2010) (“The when must be the moment that Congress made the law.  The current state of state 
law cannot matter, because it cannot have ‘retroactive’ effect. . . .  [N]o facts that arise after the 
enactment of the statute can matter to the merits of the claim.”). 
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Although others have previously wrestled with this question from time 
to time,18 it is one that remains “radically under-theorized.”19  Moreover, it is 
a question that is growing in significance today as two things change: 
(1) judges find themselves with new tools to examine the factual premise of 
a law,20 and (2) the Supreme Court is embarked on “a widespread empirical 
turn” where its opinions now rest more explicitly on factual claims about the 
way the world works.21  But, as I will demonstrate, even though facts matter 
a great deal to constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court has not given clear 
guidance about what to do when those facts change over time. 
Consider, by way of comparison to Shelby County, the 1989 decision of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.22  That case involved a constitutional challenge to 
an 1872 California law about proving paternity.23  Under the law, a child born 
 
18. The most extensive discussion of this question comes in Guido Calabresi’s book, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).  There, Judge Calabresi addresses the problem 
of obsolete statutes—laws that he says are out of step with prevailing legal principles.  Id. at 1–2.  
He argues that courts should have the authority to determine whether a statute is obsolete, and he 
calls for judicial updating and “sunsetting” of such laws.  Id. at 62–65.  Judge Calabresi does not, 
however, depend on a link to the Constitution for his theory of judicial sunsetting.  See id. at 24 
(“[A] link to constitutional infirmity, though a possible ground for nullification of statutes, is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient ground.”).  For others who have asked the question in the constitutional 
context, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 16 (2008) (“An intrinsic problem presented, however, is the abiding truth 
that whatever the facts may be today, they might change tomorrow.”); Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” 
Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 
1049, 1065–67 (1979) (arguing that courts should strike down laws no longer supported by the facts 
that caused their enactment). 
19. These words come from John McGinnis and Charles Mulaney in their discussion of a 
related literature on the deference owed to congressional fact-finding.  John O. McGinnis & Charles 
W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 69 (2008).  For others who have 
joined this discussion, see FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 129–30 (2008) (arguing that the level of 
deference to legislative fact-finding should follow the applicable standard of review protecting the 
constitutional right); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-
Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 1, 35–36 (2009) (stating that the “judicial treatment of legislative fact-
finding is sorely in need of a coherent theory” and offering a new paradigm); Neal Devins, 
Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1169, 1170–71 (2011) (calling for judicial review of legislative fact-finding that takes account of 
the comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses of courts and legislatures). 
20. For my prior work on the subject of judicial fact-finding in a digital age, see generally 
Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) 
[hereinafter Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding] (noting the tendency of the Supreme 
Court to conduct its own factual investigations outside of the record and briefing); Allison Orr 
Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2013) [hereinafter Larsen, Factual Precedents] 
(observing the phenomenon of “factual precedents” where lower courts cite the Supreme Court for 
factual propositions rather than relevant expert work); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus 
Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2014) [hereinafter Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts] 
(challenging the conventional wisdom that Supreme Court amicus briefs are a good source for 
factual expertise). 
21. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional 
Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003). 
22. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
23. Id. at 117, 119. 
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to a married woman living with her husband was presumed to be a child of 
the marriage.24  In 1872, of course, there were no DNA or blood tests that 
could establish paternity, but in 1989 times had changed.25  When Michael H. 
sued for the right to a hearing to establish his paternal rights he could have 
easily argued—foreshadowing the words from Shelby County—that 
“‘current burdens’ must be justified by ‘current needs.’”26  His brief did in 
fact make the claim that “present day technology” rendered the presumption 
in the law obsolete and unnecessary.27 
The Supreme Court did not bite, however.  Justice Scalia, writing for 
the Court, dismissed Michael’s due process claim and the child’s equal 
protection claim, relying on English bastardy laws and Blackstone’s com-
mentaries to support the notion that fathers have traditionally been unable to 
assert parental rights of a child born to a married woman.28  What makes the 
“times have changed” argument good for Shelby County but not for 
Michael H.? 
More pressing even than past inconsistency, what will become of this 
idea of a constitutional shelf life in future contexts?  The question is not just 
theoretical.  For example, federal district court dockets today are speckled 
with claims to legalize marijuana (either broadly or at least for medical use).29  
These lawsuits argue specifically that the science behind the decision to list 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug is old and that there is now a “veritable 
mountain of peer reviewed scientific evidence”30 documenting both that 
marijuana is effective in treating medical conditions and that its potential for 
abuse has been overstated.31 
 
 
 
 
24. Id. at 117–18. 
25. See id. at 161 (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing that arguments about the “stigma of 
illegitimacy” are based on times when there were no authoritative ways to establish paternity). 
26. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
27. Brief for Appellant at 17, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (No. 87-746), 1987 
WL 880072, at *17. 
28. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124–25. 
29. E.g., Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 552 F. App’x 680, 683 (9th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Pickard, No. 2:11-cr-449, 2015 WL 1767536, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015), 
Kadonsky v. Holder, No. (UNA), 2014 WL 2739303 (D.D.C. June 10, 2014). 
30. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Sacramento 
Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 2:11-cv-02939), 2012 
WL 1580711. 
31. E.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 15–16, 
Pickard, No. 2:11-cr-449, 2013 WL 10629793 (“[M]arijuana has a notably low potential for 
abuse. . . .  [T]he facts [about marijuana’s potential for abuse] upon which marijuana was scheduled 
as one of the most dangerous narcotics in 1970 have been disproven.”). 
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These plaintiffs explicitly urge, “We rely on our courts to step in and 
pronounce that the laws are outdated and are no longer valid in light of 
changed circumstances.”32  Will their invitation be accepted?  As these cases 
wind their way to the Supreme Court, should we expect to see a decision that 
the Controlled Substances Act as it relates to marijuana is invalid because—
echoing Shelby County—it bears “no logical relation to the present day?”33 
Similarly, a recent cert petition filed by funeral home directors 
challenging old regulations on their businesses asks: Does the Constitution 
allow the government to enforce obsolete laws that lack any justification 
today?34  Citing Shelby County, these plaintiffs explicitly urge the Court to 
intervene when “current burdens” are not justified by “current needs.”35 
There is something very intuitive about asking courts to police the effect 
of time on legal restrictions.  Lawmakers are not fortune-tellers, and it seems 
quite likely that laws will outlast the conditions they were meant to address.  
Moreover, the Constitution contains at least an implicit requirement that all 
laws must be rational, and it seems quite plausible that monitoring changing 
facts falls under the Court’s role in enforcing the Constitution’s guarantee 
that citizens should not be governed by arbitrary laws.  Like other parts of 
the Constitution where line drawing is difficult, sniffing out stale laws may 
just be part of the whole enterprise of judicial review, warts and all. 
And yet, recognizing a constitutional shelf life requires something more: 
it requires judicial confidence that the world has changed in a real and 
relevant way.36  Where does that confidence come from?  Should we trust the 
judicial grasp of changed facts?  Facts are easy to manipulate and the pace of 
factual change today is rapid, so it is hard for courts to keep up.  I confront 
and refute the idea that policing stale facts is a modest and narrow way to 
evaluate legislative choices. 
 
 
32. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 30, 
at 1, 2012 WL 1580711. 
33. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013). 
34. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014) (No. 14-
53), 2014 WL 3530761, at *i (“In applying rational-basis review, does a court evaluate the 
rationality of enforcing a challenged law under the factual circumstances of the world today, or must 
a court consider only the rationality of the law when enacted, no matter how long ago and no matter 
how much the facts have changed?”). 
35. Id. at 5. 
36. I acknowledge, as I must, that this same criticism can be launched at those who believe in 
the “Living Constitution” whenever the Court struggles to interpret a clause of the Constitution in 
a new way.  How, for example, does the Court know that “equality” means something different  
in 1954 than it did in 1896?  As I elaborate below, however, asking if a law is irrational because it 
is too old is the sort of judicial inquiry that is even less limited than asking if the country’s notions 
of equality have changed over time or if a certain right is rooted in the country’s tradition.  For this 
reason, concerns about judicial competence are at their apex when the Court engages in a free-form 
quest about changed facts. 
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After wrestling with the idea of a constitutional shelf life, this Article 
offers some preliminary suggestions on how courts should deal with such a 
claim.  First, I argue that a court is authorized to find a shelf life only when 
employing a heightened form of review.  Second, I identify two conditions 
for finding a shelf life that are drawn from patterns in the judicial opinions 
where this issue has arisen.  I note first that courts pay special attention to the 
Executive Branch’s enforcement practices over time and second that they 
seem to defer to the legislature when there is evidence of an ongoing political 
dialogue. 
While nothing in constitutional law is purely objective, these two 
criteria provide a somewhat neutral yardstick for judges to measure the pas-
sage of time’s effect on a once-valid law—a way to gauge, for example, when 
the necessary has become no longer necessary.  When an agency—an actor 
with an institutional advantage at recognizing factual change—urges that a 
law is outdated, a court does not stand alone in recognizing constitutional ex-
piration, and at least the appearance of opportunism is diminished.  Similarly, 
when the legislature anticipates a factual change affecting its law in the future 
(through a sunset provision or factual findings on point), that indicates that 
the political process is still functioning and open to addressing changed facts 
on its own. 
In Shelby County, all of these criteria pointed the other direction: the 
Department of Justice continued to believe the law was necessary to confront 
current conditions, and Congress had addressed the idea of changed circum-
stances in its 2006 record.  Moreover, although the case could have been 
evaluated on heightened scrutiny, the test the majority seems to have chosen 
was a form of rationality review.  Thus, even recognizing that laws can expire 
and courts can enforce a constitutional shelf life in some circumstances, 
Shelby County was still the wrong place to find one. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I explains the history behind 
the idea of a constitutional expiration date and describes how the idea will 
become more important as constitutional doctrine is increasingly entrenched 
in empirical assertions of fact.  Part II chooses six different types of cases 
across various constitutional tests—in which plaintiffs have challenged a law 
as unconstitutionally expired—and explains the Court’s treatment of those 
claims.  Part III articulates a concern that the threat of stale facts is used op-
portunistically, and Part IV then offers thoughts on when a court is authorized 
to find a constitutional shelf life.  Part V concludes by arguing that Shelby 
County does not meet any of the limiting principles I have identified and that 
the Court was thus incorrect to find a constitutional shelf life in that case. 
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I. Laying the Groundwork 
“In virtually every constitutional case,” as David Faigman explains in 
his book on the subject, “the soaring language of the Constitution is brought 
down to earth by plain facts.”37  The government can prohibit abortions only 
after the point of fetal viability, a medical fact.38  Congress can regulate 
homegrown medical marijuana only because it will substantially affect the 
larger marijuana market, an economic fact.39  And the Voting Rights Act 
coverage formula grew to be unconstitutional because it contained “40-year-
old facts [concerning voting patterns of minorities] having no logical relation 
to the present day.”40 
These are not the sort of facts specific to one case and typically assigned 
to juries, however.41  They are more generalized facts about the world, so-
called “legislative facts.”42  As I have observed before, this kind of fact is 
becoming increasingly central to Supreme Court decisions.43  The more the 
Court makes a self-conscious attempt to ground its opinions in fact and to 
anchor its reasoning in factual authorities, the more important it is to 
contemplate the possibility of a constitutional expiration date when those 
facts begin to change. 
A. How New Is the Idea of a Constitutional Shelf Life? 
The Supreme Court has flirted with the idea of a constitutional shelf life 
before its Shelby County decision.  The first extended discussion came in the 
1938 decision of United States v. Carolene Products Co.44 in a passage 
outside of the footnote that made the case famous.  The challenge there was 
 
37. FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at xii. 
38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
39. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005). 
40. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013). 
41. As an initial matter, I must concede (as I have in the past) that the line between law and fact 
is fuzzy at best.  Several scholars have argued that “[t]here is no analytic dichotomy between law 
and fact.”  McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 19, at 71.  Even if this is true, however, the label of 
“fact” is one deeply entrenched in our legal system and one that most lawyers seem to intuitively 
understand.  As a practical matter, therefore, when I say “fact,” I mean a statement that can be 
theoretically falsified and is followed by a secondary authority pointing to some sort of evidence.  
For elaboration on this definition, see generally Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 20, at 67–
73 (establishing a working dichotomy between law and fact). 
42. This phrase was coined by Kenneth Culp Davis in 1942.  Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach 
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942). 
43. For my previous thoughts on the centrality of fact-finding to the Court’s recent opinions 
and its consequences, see generally Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 
20; Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 20 (discussing the use of facts in Supreme Court 
opinions and the possible consequences of lower courts relying on the Court’s factual conclusions 
in their own decisions); Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 20 (discussing the role 
of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court’s decision-making process and expressing concern that the 
Court relies on unverified amicus briefs when making its decisions). 
44. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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to the federal Filled Milk Act, a law that prohibited the sale of milk 
compounded with nondairy oil or fat.45  The challengers threw the constitu-
tional kitchen sink at the law, claiming it was beyond the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power, a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, and a denial of equal protection.46 
The Court upheld the law, explicitly deferring to the Congressional 
finding that filled milk was harmful to public health, and thus, that there was 
a rational basis for forbidding it.47  In dicta, however, Justice Stone suggested 
that “the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a 
particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those 
facts have ceased to exist.”48 
This recognition of a shelf life for the constitutionality of a law—like 
the one acknowledged in Shelby County seventy-five years later—has 
something to do with the ability of a law’s rationality to erode.49  Although it 
was rational to believe filled milk was unhealthy in 1938, the Court reasoned, 
that might not always be the case.50  Moreover, and significantly, the 
Carolene Products majority specifically contemplated that it would be for a 
court to determine when the science behind the law no longer supported its 
constitutionality: “Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation 
whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of 
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial in-
quiry . . . .”51  For support, the Court relied on Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,52 
a 1924 opinion by Justice Holmes strongly suggesting that the emergency 
rent-control statute in Washington, D.C., should be invalidated when it was 
shown the emergency no longer existed.53 
Yet, even within both Carolene Products and Chastleton, the Supreme 
Court expressed a strong hesitation about actually invalidating a law because 
its factual premise was obsolete.  Justice Holmes remanded in Chastleton for 
fact-finding on the continuing state of emergency.54  And in Carolene 
Products, after noting that rationality can change over time, Justice Stone 
 
45. Id. at 145–46. 
46. Id. at 146–47. 
47. Id. at 152 (“[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed.”). 
48. Id. at 153.  Interestingly, Justice Black—who had recently been appointed to the Court when 
this case was decided—refused to join this part of Justice Stone’s opinion.  Hans A. Linde, Due 
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 204 (1976). 
49. Subsequently, most states have eliminated restrictions on filled milk, and a district court in 
1972 found the Filled Milk Act to be unconstitutionally irrational.  Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 
F. Supp. 221, 224 n.1, 225 (S.D. Ill. 1972). 
50. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153–54. 
51. Id. at 153. 
52. 264 U.S. 543 (1924). 
53. Id. at 547–48. 
54. Id. at 549. 
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added a strong caveat about deference to Congress: “But by their very nature 
such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be 
restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could 
reasonably be assumed affords support for it.”55 
These mixed messages likely explain why lower court judges express 
confusion and a sense of being at sea with claims that a statute has reached 
its constitutional shelf life.  Judge Guido Calabresi, when confronting such a 
claim in a case before him on the Second Circuit, offered some reasons for 
the hesitancy: 
 It is not, however, easy for courts to step in and say that what was 
rational in the past has been made irrational by the passage of time . . . .  
Precisely at what point does a court say that what once made sense no 
longer has any rational basis?  What degree of legislative action, or of 
conscious inaction, is needed when that (uncertain) point is reached?56 
A handful of lower court judges have discussed the possibility of a law 
reaching the end of its constitutional shelf life—for example, an old law 
banning pit bulls57 or old regulations forbidding food sales in funeral 
homes.58  But the collective sense among these courts is reluctance to actually 
so conclude.  As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[t]he Supreme Court has been 
ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can transform a once-rational 
statute into an irrational law.”59  Even scholarly attention to this question has 
been thin.60 
 
55. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154. 
56. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).  This 
case concerned the 100-to-1 disparity between sentencing for crack and sentencing for cocaine 
under then-existing law.  Id. at 466.  For more on this specific issue, see infra section II(B)(3). 
57. Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2009) (remanding for 
fact-finding on plaintiff’s claim that a pit-bull ban violated substantive due process because it was 
not rationally related to a legitimate government interest based on modern understandings of the pit-
bull breed). 
58. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 86 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding restrictions on funeral 
directors to sell food despite the fact that the law seemed antiquated).  For other examples where 
courts have come the closest, see TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 18–19 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that changed circumstances are relevant to a First Amendment challenge to a 
zoning law, but remanding to the district court to make the fact-specific inquiry); Jones v. 
Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 422–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (upholding a New York law 
prohibiting live mixed martial arts performances, but noting that since the passage of the ban, the 
sport had evolved to become safer). 
59. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 
1985); see also Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
appears not to have determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration 
in equal protection analysis.”); Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (first quoting Murillo, 681 
F.2d at 912 n.27; and then Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111). 
60. There are some others who have raised this question before.  See CALABRESI, supra note 
18, at 2 (“[B]ecause a statute is hard to revise once it is passed, laws are governing us that would 
not and could not be enacted today, . . . some of these laws . . . do not fit, are in some sense 
inconsistent with, our whole legal landscape.”); Bennett, supra note 18, at 1065–66 (arguing that 
courts must consider the “all too easily neglected time dimension” to rationality review); Linde, 
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Despite the uncertainty and lack of recognition, however, the types of 
laws ripe for claims of constitutional expiration are vast indeed.  They include 
regulations on network-television broadcasters arguably made unnecessary 
by the advent of digital broadcasting,61 environmental import restrictions 
made obsolete by new ways to protect certain species,62 and zoning laws on 
adult-oriented businesses that seem too strict in light of population and land-
use changes.63 
Carolene Products and ostensibly Shelby County asked the question in 
the context of rationality review (whether a legislature has a rational basis 
and legitimate reason for legislating), but there are many other doctrinal tests 
that can be affected by the passage of time, and there is no logical reason to 
confine considering the effects of time to a law’s rationality. 
Indeed, once one starts to think about it in this way, any constitutional 
test that turns on conditions—what is necessary, what is compelling, what is 
a sufficient alternative—is vulnerable to an allegation that the condition has 
changed and the law is no longer valid.  To analogize to math, the claim is 
that the formula remains the same, but the variables have changed and so the 
output should change as well.  The implications are quite significant and far-
reaching.  Notions of the evolving Constitution aside, the invocation of 
changed facts in application of settled doctrine can lead to invalidation of any 
sort of legislation challenged under a whole host of constitutional provisions. 
At this point it is important to identify two related but distinct concepts: 
sunsetting judicial opinions and dynamic statutory interpretation.  Neal 
Katyal has written about the possibility that the Court announce prospectively 
 
supra note 48, at 215 (“[L]aws are made at one time and challenged at another.  The problem of 
time is whether a law is to be judged for its rationality when it was enacted or at the time when it is 
challenged.”); cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 269, 306–07 (1999) (“The only way for 
lawmaking bodies to shut down all litigation that might present the issues raised in this Article 
would be for them to revise all their previous enactments by adding an exception for situations 
where facts are changing rapidly.”).  For an excellent student note that raises the question, see 
generally Maria Ponomarenko, Note, Changed Circumstances and Judicial Review, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1419 (2014) (arguing that a court can declare a once-valid law unconstitutional in light of 
“changed circumstances” but only when the underlying test is “substantive” and not “motives-
based”). 
61. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding content-based 
regulations on the theory that “[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is 
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this 
unique medium”), with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 533 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the “spectrum scarcity” rationale makes no sense in light of changes in 
the television market). 
62. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986) (upholding a state import ban, but warning that 
“if and when [scientifically-acceptable sampling and inspection] procedures are developed, Maine 
no longer may be able to justify its import ban”). 
63. TJS of N.Y., 598 F.3d at 23, 30 (holding that application of the First Amendment must 
confront and address “extralegal” changes in the community but remanding to trial court to make 
those factual findings). 
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a time limit to its decision—a time when the decision will cease to become 
binding authority.64  Perhaps the most familiar example of this is when Justice 
O’Connor announced in Grutter v. Bollinger65 (the 2003 decision upholding 
some affirmative action in higher education) that “25 years from now, the use 
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”66  The idea of a judicial sunset, however, is distinct from a 
constitutional shelf life because the latter leads to invalidation of a law while 
the former is about the binding power of precedent. 
Likewise, “dynamic statutory interpretation,” a phrase coined by Bill 
Eskridge, is related to but distinct from the idea of a constitutional shelf life.  
Dynamic statutory interpretation is a school of thought committed to reading 
a statute “in light of [its] present societal, political, and legal context.”67  
When a court finds what I am calling a constitutional shelf life, by contrast, 
it is not “updating” a statute but finding it to have reached the end of its 
constitutional legitimacy. 
In sum, the idea of a law expiring in a constitutional sense dates back at 
least to 1938.68  Although the Supreme Court has at times endorsed the con-
cept theoretically, it had never invalidated a law on that basis until its 2013 
decision in Shelby County.  A skeptical reader may be tempted to assume the 
idea was used opportunistically for one case and one case only.  There is, 
however, real change at work in Supreme Court opinions these days, and the 
Justices’ factual observations about the world have a heightened significance.  
This change, as demonstrated below, will make it easier for plaintiffs in the 
future to allege that a constitutionally enacted law has reached its expiration 
date, and it will make the Shelby County decision reverberate well beyond 
election-law circles. 
B. Why Stale Facts Matter More in Constitutional Doctrine Today 
A consistent thread between Shelby County, Carolene Products, and the 
lower court cases that have wrestled with the question of constitutional 
expiration is an emphasis on the role of facts in constitutional questions.  This 
makes sense.  Invalidating a law because it is outdated requires a judicial 
 
64. Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2004) (“I 
contend that the Supreme Court should prospectively declare that some of its national security 
opinions will sunset, meaning that they will lapse as binding precedent.”); see also Michael 
Gentithes, Sunsets on Constitutionality & Supreme Court Efficiency, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
374, 380–81, 394 (2014) (following up on Katyal’s essay and also arguing in favor of judicial 
sunsets for efficiency reasons). 
65. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
66. Id. at 343. 
67. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 
(1987). 
68. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). 
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certainty that the world against which the old legislators acted has changed 
in a significant and relevant way. 
At oral argument in the Shelby County case, for example, the Chief 
Justice quizzed the advocates about modern voter turnout by race using 
statistics taken from the Census Bureau’s 2004 Current Population Survey.69  
His point was to show that Mississippi—which was covered by the VRA 
formula and thus had to get approval from the federal government before 
changing its voting laws—actually had the best ratio of African-American to 
white turnout, while Massachusetts on the other hand (a state not covered) 
had the worst. 
This colloquy prompted statistics guru Nate Silver to criticize the way 
the Chief Justice used the numbers: “As much as it pleases me to see statis-
tical data introduced in the Supreme Court,” Silver wrote in the New York 
Times a few days later, “the act of citing statistical factoids is not the same 
thing as drawing sound inferences from them.”70  A “statistical sin,” Silver 
explains, is “[c]herry-picking the evidence in this way” because “it involves 
making misleading rather than merely imprecise claims.”71 
The Chief Justice is not the only one to grapple with difficult factual 
questions embedded in an allegation that a law is too old and out of touch 
with reality.  In each of the lower court cases that specifically address this 
possibility, the court was tasked with evaluating a difficult question of fact 
informed by nonlegal evidence: Are pit bulls as aggressive as the city 
lawmakers banning them twenty years ago believed?72  Have the rules of 
professional mixed martial arts evolved to the point that the sport is safer and 
it is no longer rational for a state to forbid it?73  Do we know more today 
about the effects of crack and powder cocaine on the body such that the 
 
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–32, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 
12-96) 2013 WL 6908203, at *30–32; Louis Jacobson, Was Chief Justice John Roberts Right About 
Voting Rates in Massachusetts, Mississippi?, POLITIFACT (Mar. 5, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://www 
.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/mar/05/john-roberts/was-chief-justice-john-roberts-
right-about-voting-/ [http://perma.cc/3VKA-UD3C]. 
70. Nate Silver, In Supreme Court Debate on Voting Rights Act, a Dubious Use of Statistics, 
N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 7, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/03/07/in-supreme-court-debate-on-voting-rights-act-a-dubious-use-of-statistics/?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/EX3Z-WPAG].  Nina Totenberg of NPR went further in her criticism, alleging that the 
Chief “misconstrued” the data.  Nina Totenberg, In Voting Rights Arguments, Chief Justice Miscon-
strued Census Data, NPR (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/03/01/ 
173276943/in-voting-rights-arguments-chief-justice-may-have-misconstrued-census-data [http:// 
perma.cc/8WM9-EX2V]. 
71. Silver, supra note 70. 
72. See Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing 
evidence in the record from the American Kennel Club and United Kennel Club). 
73. See Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
contentions that the “adoption of [new] rules . . . [to] reduce[] the health and safety risks to fighters” 
is enough to render a ban on professional mixed martial arts unconstitutionally irrational). 
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disparate sentencing laws of the two drugs enacted thirty years ago are no 
longer permissible?74 
When pressed to answer these questions, most of the judges in the 
aforementioned cases remanded for further fact-finding at the trial-court 
level, but they need not have done so.  As the Carolene Products dicta 
candidly acknowledged, the decision to find a law expired in a constitutional 
sense permits and almost requires judges to take “judicial notice” of factual 
change.75  And significantly, the concept of judicial notice itself has changed 
radically since the dawn of the digital age.76 
Today’s volumes of the U.S. Reports are peppered with nonlegal 
sources supporting the Justices’ factual assertions about the way the world 
works.77  These observations need not come from the record below.  It is 
increasingly common to find Justice Breyer citing studies he found on 
neuroscience78 or Justice Kennedy sorting through statistics in amicus briefs 
about the fatality rate connected with police car chases.79  Like the rest of us, 
Supreme Court Justices can access an infinite world of information at their 
fingertips now, and it is perhaps only natural that they will anchor their legal 
decisions in factual claims backed by easily found factual authorities. 
This change matters significantly for the present discussion for two 
reasons.  First, for a Justice who is hostile to an old law, it could become quite 
tempting to find the law unconstitutionally outdated, particularly when there 
are so many factual sources available to mount that charge.  Facts can be 
 
74. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]hat is known today about the 
effects of crack and cocaine, and about the impact that the crack/cocaine sentencing rules have on 
minority groups, is significantly different . . . .”). 
75. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).  “Judicial notice” refers to 
a rule of evidence that allows a fact into evidence if it is “generally known” or “can be accurately 
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 201(b).  Legislative facts are specifically exempt from the rule on judicial notice, and those 
can be acknowledged by a court without reference to the record.  See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory 
committee’s note on proposed rules (contrasting legislative facts and adjudicative facts); Ann 
Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 112 
(1988) (“The advisory committee believed that judicial absorption of general nonlegal knowledge 
should not be circumscribed . . . .”). 
76. See generally Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial Notice 
in the Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137 (2014) (discussing the effect of the Internet on 
the application of judicial notice). 
77. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 20, at 1255–57; Larsen, 
Factual Precedents, supra note 20, at 77; see also Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The 
Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 658–68 (1988) 
(surveying the use of facts in judicial opinions); Zick, supra note 21, at 118 (“Constitutional law is 
now in the throes of a widespread empirical turn, a quantitative mood swing that is consistent with 
a more general societal turn toward all things scientific.”); cf. Ellie Margolis, Authority Without 
Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 912 
(2011) (observing that the digital revolution has blurred the line between legal and nonlegal 
authority in recent judicial opinions). 
78. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
79. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2274–75 (2011). 
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easily manipulated, and as the sea of factual information expands rapidly, so 
too does the range of evidence available to make an old law seem irrational 
and out of touch with modern times. 
Not only does the field of data increase, but also the Internet Age gives 
judges a bolstered confidence in wielding that data.  Note that Nate Silver 
was not accusing the Chief Justice of finding faulty information—the Chief’s 
numbers came from census figures and were part of the record.  Instead, the 
bigger problem, according to Silver, was “not with the statistics he cites but 
with the conclusion he draws from them.”80  He cautioned against assuming 
the Massachusetts and Mississippi examples were representative of a larger 
trend, and he worried about using statistics to infer causality when that 
inference is not supported.81  This judicial confidence with and hunger for 
facts, in other words, creates the potential for misusing information. 
Second, and related, as constitutional decisions are increasingly 
grounded in facts and justified by appealing to factual authorities, they will 
be more vulnerable in the future to invalidation on the basis of new facts.  
Depending on one’s point of view, this could be a positive development, but 
it is hard to deny that it adds a layer of instability to constitutional law. 
David Faigman has explored this facet of fact-bound constitutional 
doctrine before, using the iconic case of Brown v. Board82 as his example.83  
One could easily describe the holding in Brown as grounded in fact: black 
children are psychologically harmed by attending segregated schools (citing, 
of course, the social-science studies in the decision’s famous footnote 
eleven).84 
Because facts are fickle and easy to manipulate (even fifty years ago), a 
county in Georgia challenged the Brown decision and defended segregation 
by reasoning that children in Georgia were not actually psychologically 
harmed by segregation (citing their own expert testimony for support).85  In 
1963, a trial judge agreed with them in a case called Stell v. Savannah-
Chatham,86 distinguishing Brown since it was based on “facts, not law.”87  
“Whether Negroes in Kansas believed that separate schooling denoted 
inferiority,” he explained, “was as much a subject for scientific inquiry as the 
braking distance required to stop a two-ton truck moving at ten miles an hour 
on dry concrete.”88 
 
80. Silver, supra note 70. 
81. Id. 
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
83. FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 16–19. 
84. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
85. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cty. Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 668–76 (S.D. Ga. 1963). 
86. 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963). 
87. Id. at 678. 
88. Id. 
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This 1963 interpretation of Brown reveals an interesting quirk about the 
question of a constitutional shelf life.  While modern constitutional law stu-
dents see Brown as the quintessential law-transformation case (embracing a 
change to the prevailing interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause), it is 
quite possible that the Justices who decided Brown saw it as a shelf-life case 
(a case involving the application of new facts to settled law).  After all, the 
Brown Court emphasized the “changed circumstances” of public education 
between 1896 and 1954,89 and Justice Jackson’s unpublished concurrence 
included a section entitled “does the Amendment contemplate changed 
conditions?”90  If one believes that Supreme Court decisions have life cycles 
and stand for different propositions over time, then perhaps Brown began as 
a shelf-life case and evolved to a case that today stands for a change in consti-
tutional meaning. 
In any event, on appeal the Fifth Circuit in Stell reversed this modest 
understanding of Brown, holding that Brown was not “limited to the facts of 
the cases there presented.”91  But the larger point about the power of facts to 
undermine constitutional decisions remains—particularly when a judge is 
hostile to the law in question.  As Faigman puts it, “[g]iven their proclivity 
for change, either because our knowledge of the facts improves over time or 
the facts themselves change, [facts] seem to provide a disturbingly unsteady 
foundation for constitutional doctrine.”92 
If this was true in 1963, it is significantly truer today.  For one thing, the 
social-science evidence in Brown and Stell was introduced at trial and came 
from the record.93  Now, however, this type of evidence can come to the 
Court’s attention in a myriad of different ways: from dozens of amicus briefs, 
from the Supreme Court librarians, or from the Justices’ independent 
research.94 
Moreover, as the Justices’ decisions increasingly turn on claims of 
generalized facts, future parties and future judges will inevitably start to 
impeach those factual assertions with readily available information.  
Consider, for example, the events following the Court’s Citizens United95 
decision, in which it held there was no evidence that campaign expenditures 
led to political corruption.96  Not even a full year later, litigants in Montana 
challenged an almost identical campaign finance restriction in their state on 
 
89. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489–90, 489 n.4. 
90. Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and the Brown Case, 1988 
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 258 n.51. 
91. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cty. Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964). 
92. FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 19. 
93. Stell, 220 F. Supp. at 672; Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment 
on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 55 (2013). 
94. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 20, at 1286–90. 
95. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
96. Id. at 360. 
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the basis of a new and different factual record.97  Although they eventually 
lost at the U.S. Supreme Court (in a summary reversal), they met success 
below because the Montana Supreme Court explained that “Citizens United 
was decided under its facts or lack of facts.”98  The supposedly factual 
dimension of the Court’s Citizens United decision, in other words, simply 
invites distinctions and dissenters when other facts are readily available. 
The point for now is to call attention to the significance that constitu-
tional pressure from stale facts can bring.  As facts become more central to 
constitutional doctrine and with new tools available to access those facts 
quickly and more conveniently, the threat of finding constitutional staleness 
becomes quite meaningful. 
II. Examples of Allegedly Stale Laws 
The Voting Rights Act is not the first law ever to be challenged as 
unconstitutionally stale, and it will not be the last.  Below are six categories 
of cases (past and pending) in which plaintiffs have claimed that the factual 
premise behind a law is too old, therefore rendering the law unconstitutional.  
The examples vary in both the nature of the constitutional violation alleged 
and the standard of review or doctrinal test employed.  A closer inspection of 
these cases, however, reveals a few consistent themes. 
A.  Due Process Clause 
Perhaps the most natural doctrinal home for a claim that a law has 
reached the end of its constitutional shelf life is the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.  Dating back at least to the mid-
nineteenth century (and before that if one counts the interpretation of due 
process clauses in state constitutions), the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
words “liberty” and “property” in the Due Process Clause to prevent not just 
procedurally deficient laws but also substantively arbitrary ones.99 
Although now known by the perhaps oxymoronic name, “substantive 
due process,” the idea that the Constitution includes a general substantive 
protection against arbitrary laws has a deep-rooted pedigree in the American 
 
97. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 5 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). 
98. Id. at 6. 
99. See Linde, supra note 48, at 199 (asking about due process of lawmaking and observing 
that the rule against substantively arbitrary laws is not a new one).  Gerald Gunther in fact argued 
for a revival in rationality review over forty years ago.  He “would have the Court take seriously a 
constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must 
substantially further legislative ends.”  Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1972); see 
also Linde, supra note 48, at 215 (“For a main difficulty with reviewing laws for rationality is the 
problem of time . . . .”). 
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constitutional tradition.100  It is not a stretch to assume this protection guards 
against injuries that occur when one is subject to an outdated law.101 
Since 1937 and the “constitutional revolution” that ended the Lochner102 
era, however, allegations that a law is based on outdated facts and thus a 
violation of Due Process generally fall under the very deferential standard of 
review known as “rationality review.”103  Under this standard, government 
action will pass muster if it is rationally related to a legitimate interest.104  As 
long as there is not a fundamental right at stake or a class of citizens in need 
of special protection (e.g., race, gender), rationality review generally gives 
the government the benefit of the doubt.105 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court has shown little sympathy for 
allegations that facts have changed and laws have grown to be irrational.106  
“[T]hose challenging the legislative judgment,” the Court has explained, 
“must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification 
is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true . . . .”107  
 
100. Justice Bradley is often given credit for this doctrinal development with his dissent in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that liberty and property are not truly recognized if they may “arbitrarily 
assailed”).  This general protection against arbitrary laws has an even older pedigree, however.  State 
courts enforcing constitutions with due process clauses often invoked the Magna Carta for the 
proposition that the language of “due process” includes a substantive protection against 
arbitrariness.  EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND 
DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 90–91 (photo. reprint 1978) (1948); see also 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764  (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Due Process 
Clause imposes on courts an “obligation to give substantive content to the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due 
process of law’”). 
101. Indeed, criminal law scholars might be reminded of the ancient doctrine of “desuetude,” 
which is the judicial abrogation of a criminal statute that has gone unenforced for a long period of 
time.  Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2210 (2006).  The principal rationale for 
desuetude has been about fair notice for illegal acts, but advocates of the doctrine often advance a 
constitutional variation with a substantive due process component: “[T]he constitutional argument 
for desuetude doctrine sees in the Constitution a means of protecting an individual against being 
plucked from a sea of conspicuous offenders and charged with committing a crime . . . .”  Id. at 
2216.  As it currently stands, only West Virginia recognizes desuetude as a viable defense.  Id. at 
2209. 
102. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (holding 
that legislators are entitled to deference and listing categories of cases that would be subject to the 
Court’s more stringent review). 
104. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (“[W]here we find that the 
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen 
regulatory scheme necessary . . . our investigation is at an end.”). 
105. Id. 
106. Indeed, for over seventy years now, “the Court . . . has turned back every due process 
attack based on a mere lack of rationality.”  Linde, supra note 48, at 204.  The tide may be turning, 
however.  At least one Fifth Circuit case has recently found that state regulations on caskets 
irrationally excluded certain producers in violation of the Due Process Clause.  St. Joseph Abbey v. 
Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013). 
107. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)). 
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Although Supreme Court plaintiffs have made these arguments about 
changed circumstances and the Due Process Clause, they have never once 
been victorious. 
In 1907 and 1913, for example, Arkansas passed two “full-crew laws” 
that specified the personnel and size of the crew that certain trains had to 
employ.108  The Supreme Court dismissed challenges to those laws shortly 
after they were passed, but by 1968, the plaintiffs had a new argument in 
hand.109  In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,110 the plain-
tiffs built a voluminous record documenting the changes to the industry and 
the “progressive obsolescence of the jobs of firemen and third brakemen in 
freight and yard service as a consequence of technological and other changes 
which have occurred over the past forty years.”111  The “overwhelming 
evidence,” the challengers argued, was that the old law overestimated the 
number of crew needed; it was a law based on an outdated understanding of 
how the industry operated.112  Therefore, they argued, it was an arbitrary law 
prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 
The plaintiffs won their case in the district court on this argument, but 
the Supreme Court disagreed.114  The Court found relevant the long history 
of dispute over crew size between employers, unions, and lawmakers.115  
Justice Black, writing for the Court, emphasized the “frequent and recent 
legislative re-evaluation of the full-crew problem.”116  He observed that 
although this specific law remained unchanged, railroad safety laws in 
general had been “subject to close scrutiny” over the years, and “some safety 
requirements considered out of date have been repealed.”117  He also ob-
served that a proposal to repeal the full-crew statutes in Arkansas was placed 
on the ballot for popular referendum in 1958 and defeated.118 
Given this political back-and-forth, Justice Black thought it inappro-
priate for a court to “indulge” in what was really a legislative call.119  The 
evidence on the need for additional crew even in the face of modern 
 
108. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 
U.S. 129, 133 (1968). 
109. Id. at 130–31. 
110. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 
U.S. 129 (1968). 
111. Brief for Appellees at 30–31, Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 393 U.S. 129 
(Nos. 16, 18), 1968 WL 112592, at *30–31. 
112. Id. at 63–74. 
113. Id. at 19. 
114. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 393 U.S. at 144. 
115. Id. at 133–34. 
116. Id. at 134. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 136. 
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technology was mixed, he explained.120  It was inappropriate for the Court to 
make “findings of fact” (the quotation marks are Justice Black’s), when in 
reality it was just supplanting a democratic judgment.121  The ongoing 
discussion in the political branches made it an inappropriate place for the 
Court to step in and find an old law too stale.122 
Lest one think this type of due process challenge is a thing of the past, a 
recently filed cert petition at the Court made a very similar claim (and in fact 
relied on Shelby County to do so).  In Heffner v. Murphy,123 a group of 
Pennsylvania funeral directors challenged that state’s regulations of their 
type of business.124  Specifically, they allege that “modern realities” make the 
once-rational laws (restricting, for example, the selling of food at funeral 
homes) now obsolete.125  With the advent of air conditioning and modern 
hygiene practices, they argue, it no longer makes sense to prevent funeral 
homes from serving food, even if such a restriction was rational in 1952 when 
the law was written.126 
Citing the language about changed circumstances in Carolene Products 
and the “current burdens” language from Shelby County, these modern 
petitioners argue that it is the Court’s job to ensure “when government 
officials take away a liberty interest today, they do so for reasons that are 
rational today, not merely for reasons that were rational long ago.”127  The 
appeals court in that case, however, rejected the plaintiff’s claims, explaining 
that being “antiquated” is not “a constitutional flaw.”128 
 
 
 
120. Id. at 136–37. 
121. Id. at 138–39. 
122. Id. at 144. 
123. 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014). 
124. Id. at 61–62. 
125. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 7–10, 2014 WL 3530761, at *7–10.  This 
claim has been made in other similar contexts.  Florists in Louisiana, for example, have challenged 
state operating license laws as “totally outdated and a complete waste of time.”  Appellants’ Brief 
at 11, Meadows v. Odom, 198 F. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-30450), 2005 WL 6111808, at 
*11. 
126. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 9–12, 2014 WL 3530761, at *9–12. 
127. Id. at 5, 33.  Like I do, this petition clarifies that they are not arguing the Constitution itself 
has changed, just that “laws can become so obsolete as to be irrational under the Constitution.”  
Funeral Consumers Alliance, Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Appeal to US Supreme Court, 
FUNERAL CONSUMERS ALLIANCE: THE DAILY DIRGE (July 21, 2014, 12:28 PM), https://www 
.funerals.org/newsandblogsmenu/blogdailydirge/3176-2014heffnerappeal [http://perma.cc/M9P4-
QMJG]. 
128. Heffner, 745 F.3d at 62. The Supreme Court eventually denied cert in this case.  Heffner, 
135 S. Ct. at 220. 
LARSEN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2015  4:01 PM 
2015] Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life? 79 
B. Equal Protection Clause 
A doctrinal cousin to the Due Process Clause cases just discussed are 
claims that statutes have grown obsolete such that they now deny “equal 
protection of the laws” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.129  
Allegations like these of course are either given rationality review or a brand 
of heightened scrutiny (intermediate or strict) if a race or gender classifica-
tion is involved.130  Examples from all three standards are discussed below. 
1.  Rationality Review.—In 1924, Congress created the Foreign Service, 
then revised the law in 1946 to establish a new retirement system for Foreign 
Service officers.131  Part of that law required a mandatory retirement age of 
sixty.  The compulsory retirement was justified because “the Foreign Service 
involves extended overseas duty under difficult and often hazardous con-
ditions and that the wear and tear on members of this corps is such that there 
comes a time when these posts should be filled by younger persons.”132 
In 1979, a group of Foreign Service officers who were being forced into 
retirement brought a lawsuit claiming that the law violated their 
constitutional rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection component of the 
Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment.133  They argued (backed up by 
evidence in the record) that times had changed since Congress last visited the 
issue thirty years earlier: “Foreign Service employees today—in the tropics 
and elsewhere—have air-conditioned offices, cars and government-supplied 
housing, government-furnished airplane transportation, government fur-
nished inoculations against those contagious diseases which are still preva-
lent, and government-furnished medical facilities for any illness which does 
occur.”134  These changes, they argued, rendered the reasons for the manda-
tory retirement age arbitrary, outdated, unnecessary and now a violation of 
their equal protection rights.135 
On rationality review in a case called Vance v. Bradley,136 the Supreme 
Court responded with great deference to the Congressional choice.137  Once 
again, it was important to the Court that Congress “ha[d] gone to great 
 
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Of course analogous federal claims arise under the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  U.S.  CONST. amend. V. 
130. See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining how to decide 
which level of scrutiny to apply in equal protection cases). 
131. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98 (1979). 
132. Id. at 103. 
133. Id. at 94–95. 
134. Brief for the Appellees at 34, Vance, 440 U.S. 93 (No. 77-1254), 1978 WL 207230, at *34. 
135. See id. (explaining that such changes have substantially increased life expectancy and 
improved overseas conditions so that there is no justification for a lower retirement age of sixty in 
the Foreign Service). 
136. 440 U.S. 93 (1979). 
137. See id. at 108–09 (finding that a mandatory retirement age of sixty rationally furthers 
Congress’s legitimate objective of maintaining the Foreign Service’s competence). 
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lengths” to ponder this issue by legislating separately for the Foreign Service 
and by revisiting the issue twice.138  Even if the line drawn by Congress was 
imperfect, the Court reasoned, “perfection is by no means required” for the 
Constitution to be satisfied.139 
2. Gender Classifications & Immigration.—Even when laws classifying 
by race or gender are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause and thus 
given a more critical judicial eye, the Court has turned its back on allegations 
that the laws are constitutionally expired. 
One good example comes from the immigration context concerning how 
to prove parentage for claims of citizenship.  The Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952 imposed different requirements for acquiring citizenship 
depending on whether a child’s citizen parent was the mother or the father.140  
For children born abroad and out of wedlock to U.S. citizen mothers, citizen-
ship is established at birth.141  For similarly situated children born to U.S. 
citizen fathers, the law imposed a set of requirements necessary before estab-
lishing citizenship.142 
Tuan Nguyen, a lawful permanent resident born in Vietnam to a 
Vietnamese mother and a U.S. citizen father, challenged this distinction as 
part of his deportation proceedings.143  Nguyen argued that the law drew 
distinctions based on gender in violation of equal protection.144  Gender dis-
tinctions are subject to an intermediate scrutiny: the discrimination must be 
substantially related to an important government interest.145 
 
 
 
138. Id. at 106. 
139. Id. at 108 (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 
(1960)). 
140. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59–60 (2001).  The law was amended in 1986 to include an 
additional option for the father to prove he was the providing parent, but the principal gender 
distinction remained.  Id. at 60. 
141. Id. at 59–60. 
142. Id.  There are three cases in recent years that address this issue.  Miller v. Albright, 523 
U.S. 420 (1998), and Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53, involved challenges to the father–mother disparity in 
proof of parentage, although only Nguyen was decided on that ground.  United States v. Flores-
Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011), 
involved the slightly different issue of disparate parental residency requirements that apply to 
fathers and mothers of children born outside of this country to unmarried parents.  For an interesting 
argument explaining “the development and durability of gender-asymmetrical” citizenship law in 
these three cases, see generally Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship 
and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014). 
143. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57–58. 
144. Brief of Petitioners at 11, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1706737, at *11. 
145. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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The government emphasized as its interest “the importance of assuring 
that a biological parent-child relationship exists.”146  This assurance, they 
said, is verifiable naturally upon birth in the case of the mother but not so 
with the father.147 
Both Nguyen and other plaintiffs who had challenged the law before 
him argued that changes in technology rendered this once-important interest 
not so important anymore.  As the petitioner explained in Miller v. Albright148 
(a case presenting the same issue but not decided on those grounds): 
Before the advent of reliable genetic testing, this requirement of 
legitimation may well have been a reasonable method for preventing 
fraud, as false fathers would be more likely to claim paternity once a 
child had reached majority . . . .   
. . . . 
[But r]ecent progress in developing highly specific tests for genetic 
markers now permits the exclusion of over 99 percent of those 
wrongly accused of paternity . . . .  These advances . . . eliminate the 
rationale for placing arbitrary time limitations on the establishment of 
paternity . . . .149 
Like the plaintiffs in Shelby County, these plaintiffs argued that the 
passage of time changed the constitutional calculation: the current burdens 
of the law (disparate treatment of men and women) were not justified by 
current conditions (the fact that now DNA testing allowed for a gender-
neutral way of ascertaining parentage).150 
But even on an admittedly tougher standard of review, the Court did not 
accept the “times have changed” argument.  Citing great deference to Con-
gress, the Court found this purported interest to be important even in the face 
of DNA testing and then went on to reject the claim that it perpetuated gender 
stereotypes as opposed to recognizing a real difference between men and 
women.  The Court held that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not require that 
Congress elect one particular mechanism from among many possible 
methods of establishing paternity, even if that mechanism arguably might be 
the most scientifically advanced method.”151 
Interestingly, a few pages later the Court did credit an argument made 
by the government about a change in the times.  It held: 
[W]e find that the passage of time has produced additional and even 
more substantial grounds to justify the statutory distinction.  The ease 
of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign countries 
 
146. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. 
147. Id. 
148. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
149. Brief of Petitioner at 18, Miller, 523 U.S. 420 (No. 96-1060), 1997 WL 325338, at *18 
(emphasis omitted). 
150. Id. at 18–19. 
151. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63. 
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have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of real concern 
when we contemplate the prospect of [granting citizenship based on 
male parentage to children born to unmarried parents abroad].152 
It is hard not to suspect opportunism when in the same opinion the Court 
credits the “times have changed” argument concerning travel frequency but 
ignores it with respect to the more obvious change in DNA testing.  
Admittedly, the Court gives Congress a sort of superdeference when it comes 
to immigration matters, and that “plenary power” must be a factor in these 
cases even when the standard of review is supposedly stricter.153  That being 
said, as will be described below, absent any neutral standards to guide the 
evaluation of the constitutional pressure caused by the passage of time, the 
Court has ample opportunity to credit changed facts only when it is 
convenient to do so. 
3. Race & Crack/Cocaine Sentencing.—A more complicated story 
about the Supreme Court’s treatment of stale facts involves the disparity in 
sentences for offenses involving crack and powder cocaine.  “Crack and 
powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug”—the latter is typically 
inhaled through the nose and the former is blended with baking soda and 
divided into “rocks” that are smoked.154 
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which created a 
series of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses linked to the 
drug’s weight.155  In 1986, crack cocaine was a relatively new drug, but its 
dangers were highlighted as great cause for alarm.156  The legislative record 
reveals that Congress believed crack was significantly more harmful than 
powder cocaine because it was highly addictive, led to more violence, and 
was particularly harmful for children who had been exposed to the drug 
during their mother’s pregnancy.157  Based on these assumptions, Congress 
adopted a 100-to-1 sentencing ratio that “treated every gram of crack cocaine 
as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine.”158 
By the mid-1990s, defendants across the country began to challenge this 
100-to-1 sentencing disparity as a violation of their equal protection rights.159  
These arguments alleged changed circumstances because: (1) modern science 
 
152. Id. at 65–66. 
153. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration 
and Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2000) (noting that “the Supreme Court has 
explicitly accorded Congress unusual deference” in immigration matters). 
154. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94 (2007). 
155. Id. at 95. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 95–96. 
158. Id. at 96. 
159. E.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Peterson, 
143 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (E.D. Va. 2001); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991). 
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did not support the view that crack was more addictive or dangerous than 
powder cocaine, and (2) the sentencing disparity had caused an adverse and 
unfair impact on racial minorities who statistics show are the primary 
consumers of crack cocaine.160 
These claims were largely unsuccessful across the lower courts, 
although they drew a sympathetic ear from Judge Calabresi on the Second 
Circuit in a case called United States v. Then.161  Judge Calabresi concurred 
in the judgment sustaining the 100-to-1 ratio because he did not find 
purposeful race discrimination and, thus, did not think the heightened 
scrutiny justified.162  He did, however, suggest that because “what is known 
today about the effects of crack and cocaine” has changed significantly, 
“constitutional arguments that were unavailing in the past may not be 
foreclosed in the future.”163 
To support this intuition, he observed that the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission—the agency charged with drafting guidelines to cabin judicial 
sentencing discretion—had conducted an extended investigation on this issue 
and reported to Congress its opinion “that there is scant evidence to support 
the notion that crack poses a substantially greater threat to drug users.”164 
Despite this strong evidence of changed circumstances, however, Judge 
Calabresi was unwilling to find a constitutional shelf life.  In particularly 
candid language, he worried about how a court should measure when time 
erodes a law’s constitutionality.  He explained: “Too many issues of line 
drawing make such judicial decisions hazardous.  Precisely at what point 
does a court say that what once made sense no longer has any rational 
basis? . . .  These difficulties . . . counsel restraint, and do so powerfully.”165 
Several years after Judge Calabresi contemplated this issue, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered it too but in a slightly different context.  In 2004, 
the law governing sentencing generally in this country took a sharp turn.  In 
 
160. Then, 56 F.3d at 466. 
161. 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995). 
162. Id. at 467 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995), http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-
and-reports/drug-topics/special-report-congress-cocaine-and-federal-sentencing-policy-february-
1995 [http://perma.cc/9G9H-29SU]).  In an additional report released in 2002, the Commission 
reported to Congress that (1) the 1986 law overstates the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine, 
(2) the negative effects of prenatal crack-cocaine exposure are identical to the negative effects of 
prenatal powder-cocaine exposure, and (3) that the sentencing differential fostered disrespect for 
the criminal justice system due to the widely held perception that it promotes disparity based on 
race.  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–98 (2007) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 94, 103 (2002), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/ 
200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q5ZC-SHUW]). 
165. Then, 56 F.3d at 468 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
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United States v. Booker,166 the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines 
were unconstitutional, must be “effectively advisory,” and could not 
mandatorily bind the discretion of sentencing judges.167  This mattered for 
the crack/cocaine issue because the relevant sentencing guideline adopted the 
100-to-1 ratio straight from the 1986 law.168 
In 2004, a district judge in Virginia took advantage of this new Booker 
discretion and sentenced a defendant with a crack offense to far less than 
what the 100-to-1 statute and sentencing guidelines would require.169  The 
district court explained his actions by saying “the case exemplified the 
disproportionate and unjust effect that crack/cocaine guidelines have in 
sentencing.”170  In a 2007 case called Kimbrough,171 the Court held that the 
judge was permitted to do so given its freedom in Booker.172 
The Kimbrough Court did not hold that the 1986 law had expired or that 
a reduction in the 100-to-1 ratio was required by the Constitution.  It nonethe-
less bears on the current discussion because Justice Ginsburg (writing for the 
Court) did question whether the assumptions Congress legislated against in 
1986 continued to hold true today.173  And, interestingly, for that inquiry she 
emphasized the role of fact-finding by the relevant agency.174 
Because the crack/cocaine sentencing guideline was passed by the 
Commission immediately after the 1986 statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote it 
was done quickly and not based on “empirical data and national experi-
ence.”175  By contrast, the 1995, 2002, and 2007 reports from the Commission 
recommending lowering the ratio were based on an elaborate review by an 
agency with significant expertise.176  It was this later “research and experi-
ence”—developed after what Congress knew in 1986—that got the Court’s 
 
166. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
167. Id. at 245. 
168. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96–97. 
169. Id. at 92–93, 92 n.2. 
170. Id. at 93. 
171. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
172. Id. at 111. 
173. Id. at 95–96.  The Court was invited to consider these changed circumstances in 
Kimbrough.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of 
Petitioner at 12–13, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330) (“Twenty years after the promulgation 
of the 100:1 ratio, it is universally understood that these assumptions were factually incorrect.  With 
the benefit of further research, expert testimony, and more experience with crack offenses in the 
criminal-justice system, even the Sentencing Commission has concluded that the 100:1 ratio . . . 
seriously overstates the harm of crack offenses.”). 
174. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108–09. 
175. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(McConnell, J., concurring)). 
176. Id. at 99–100.  As Justice Ginsburg explains, the 2007 recommendation from the 
Sentencing Commission did more than just await Congressional action.  Id. at 99.  It adopted a 
change to the guidelines, reducing the ratio.  Id. at 99–100.  The Commission called this only a 
“partial remedy,” however, and still requested appropriate legislative action.  Id. at 100. 
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attention.177  Given the new reality as reflected in the Commission’s more 
recent actions, the Court held, it was reasonable for the district court to adjust 
a sentence for the disproportionate effect the 100-to-1 ratio had on racial 
minorities generally.178  It was changed circumstances concerning what we 
know now about dangers of crack—changes acknowledged by a federal 
agency—that justified altering the sentence.179 
C.  Emergencies 
The lapse of time between a law’s enactment and its constitutional 
expiration need not be fifty years or even thirty years.  When the question at 
hand involves an emergency (due to military conflict or otherwise), what is 
necessary at one point may cease to be necessary relatively quickly.  Emer-
gencies thus present a special context where a law can meet its constitutional 
expiration date. 
The Court has basically said as much in the 1924 decision about rent 
control, written by Justice Holmes and mentioned briefly above.180  In 
Chastleton v. Sinclair, the Court heard a constitutional challenge to a D.C. 
rent control statute that was enacted to prevent rent profiteering in the wake 
of World War I and the increased population the city was experiencing.181  
The law was originally enacted as temporary legislation in 1919 (sunsetting 
in two years); the statute specifically described a national emergency 
stemming from the war with Germany.182  It was reenacted in 1921183 and 
extended again for two more years in 1922, with a legislative finding “that 
the emergency . . . still exists and continues in the District of Columbia.”184 
 
177. Id. at 97. 
178. See id. at 109–10 (holding that it would “not be an abuse of discretion” for the district 
court to adjust the sentence). 
179. Following Kimbrough, Congress passed The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and reduced the 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences from 100:1 to 18:1.  Dorsey v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2012).  There are still lawsuits challenging this new ratio as a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, and at least some sentencing courts continue to take account of changed 
circumstances when refusing to apply it.  E.g., United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 892 
(N.D. Iowa 2011) (“In one respect the ‘new’ 18:1 guideline ratio is more irrational and pernicious 
than the original 100:1.  When the 100:1 ratio was enacted, Congress and the Sentencing 
Commission did not have access to the overwhelming scientific evidence that they now have.  This 
overwhelming scientific evidence now demonstrates that the difference between crack and powder 
is like the difference between ice and water—or beer and wine.”). 
180. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924). 
181. See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, THE GREAT RENT WARS: NEW YORK, 1917-1929, at 133, 163 
(2013) (discussing the Saulsbury Resolution and the Ball Rent Act in D.C.). 
182. Food Control and District of Columbia Rents Act § 122, 41 Stat. 297, 304 (1919) (“It is 
hereby declared that the provisions of this title are made necessary by emergencies growing out of 
the war with the Imperial German Government . . . .  It is also declared that this title shall be 
considered temporary legislation, and that it shall terminate on the expiration of two years from the 
date of the passage of this Act, unless sooner repealed.”). 
183. Act of Aug. 24, 1921, 42 Stat. 200, 200. 
184. Act of May 22, 1922, 42 Stat. 543, 543–44. 
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When a challenge to the law reached the Supreme Court in 1921, Justice 
Holmes wrote the majority opinion upholding it.185  But in 1924, times had 
changed.  Justice Holmes demanded to know whether the D.C. population 
was still artificially high due to the war.186  He refused to rely on what he 
would call a Congressional “prophecy” about the end of the emergency 
conditions and instead remanded for fact-finding at the district court.187  
Holmes explained “[a] law depending upon the existence of an emergency or 
other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency 
ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.”188  A different 
lower court—relying on Justice Holmes’s language—went on to find the 
emergency extinct and the statute invalid.189 
This language from Justice Holmes has been picked up by subsequent 
litigants arguing that changed circumstances and the fleeting nature of 
emergencies should affect the constitutional evaluation of military action.190  
Korematsu v. United States191 provides a controversial example where such 
an allegation was made.  In that familiar case (the first, in fact, to articulate 
that racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized), an American citizen 
was convicted for remaining in his California home despite an executive 
order—validated by Congressional act—requiring all persons of Japanese 
ancestry to evacuate.192 
Following the Japanese attacks at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
the United States feared a Japanese invasion of the West Coast.193  By the 
time the Supreme Court decided Korematsu in 1944, this fear had abated.194  
Korematsu claimed in fact that the threat of invasion “had disappeared” by 
 
185. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153, 158 (1921). 
186. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1924) (remanding to the district 
court for more fact-finding on this issue). 
187. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 191–92 (2008) 
(explaining Holmes’s holding and reasoning in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair). 
188. Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 547–48. 
189. Vermeule, supra note 187, at 167–68. 
190. E.g., Brief for National Lawyers Guild, as Amicus Curiae at 8, Albertson v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (No. 3), 1965 WL 130085, at *8 (“Surrounding 
circumstances have greatly changed since July 1, 1952. . . .  It can scarcely be presumed that the 
Communist Party’s activities have remained stable and unchanging, despite changing personnel and 
circumstances, over so long a period.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 26, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116 (1958) (No. 481), 1958 WL 92031, at *26 (“Let us assume that, as the Government contends, 
8 U. S. C. § 1185 authorizes travel control in the event of a Presidential declaration of national 
emergency.  This would not insulate the declaration from judicial scrutiny to determine whether the 
emergency exists and whether it is a justifiable basis for the controls.”). 
191. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
192. Id. at 215–16. 
193. Id. at 223. 
194. By December 1944, the federal government had issued Public Proclamation 21 allowing 
detained Japanese Americans to return home.  COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND 
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 235–36 (1982), https://www.archives.gov/ 
research/japanese-americans/justice-denied/ [https://perma.cc/KRQ4-SMHZ]. 
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March 1942 when the executive order was written and certainly in May when 
he was charged with violating it.195  An amicus brief filed on his behalf in 
that case put it this way:  
In short, General DeWitt justifies an action that he took at the end of 
March, 1942, on the basis of conditions which existed more than three 
months before and which had been corrected or markedly altered by 
the time he issued his orders.  The question to be asked is not whether 
evacuation would have been reasonable if no wartime controls had 
been instituted, but whether it was necessary and reasonable in the face 
of the long series of safeguards to West Coast and national security 
which were established by the civil authorities before evacuation.196 
Asking what is necessary to national security is a question with an 
answer that will unavoidably change with the passage of time.  War is a 
concept with a temporal limitation, and a military order justified in December 
may well be stale by the next spring.  Is it proper for a court to police that 
line?  The Korematsu Court thought not; it did not address the argument—
even on strict scrutiny and even under “the calm perspective of hindsight.”197 
More recent wars have made the question even more difficult, as the 
nature of war evolves and the question of what is a “necessary and 
appropriate” use of force is colored by the passage of time.  Adrian Vermeule 
has even suggested that we might see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld198—the 2006 
Supreme Court decision striking down military commissions as illegal—as a 
case of judicial “sunsetting of emergency powers” and a declaration that “the 
post-9/11 emergency had passed.”199 
As Vermeule explains, Holmes viewed the existence and duration of 
emergencies as questions of fact that could change over time and believed 
that judges were required to evaluate these factual questions as part of a check 
on government emergency powers.200  Interestingly, this is the opposite view 
from the one typically articulated by courts where constitutional expiration 
is alleged.  In other contexts, as we have seen, the dominant view is 
skepticism and hesitation when presented with arguments about a law’s shelf 
life.201  This leads one to wonder whether the fleeting nature of an emer-
gency—by definition—invites and authorizes a court to find a constitutional 
shelf life in a unique way. 
 
195. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. 
196. Brief of Japanese American Citizens League, Amicus Curiae at 70, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 
214 (No. 22), 1944 WL 42852, at *70. 
197. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224. 
198. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
199. Vermeule, supra note 187, at 192–93. 
200. Id. at 164–65. 
201. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
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D. First Amendment 
Another Constitutional provision ripe for claims that old laws impose 
arbitrary and antiquated burdens is the First Amendment.  The constitutional 
shelf life claim comes up in a variety of First Amendment contexts and under 
a variety of different doctrinal tests. 
1. Red Lion and Broadcast Spectrum Scarcity.—Perhaps the most 
familiar allegation that a law has reached constitutional expiration is a call to 
relieve federal regulation of broadcasters. 
In the 1950s, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) imposed 
a series of regulations requiring that the discussion of public issues by 
broadcasters be even sided.202  This “fairness doctrine” required that broad-
casters allot equal on-air time to political candidates and allow for the 
discussion of all sides of any public issue.203  In 1967, a broadcaster chal-
lenged this law as an unconstitutional infringement of its editorial judgment 
in violation of the First Amendment.204  But in a decision called Red Lion205 
the Supreme Court rejected that argument and sustained the regulation.206 
Justice White, writing for the Court, explained that broadcast regulation 
was necessary because broadcast spectrum is scarce.207  As others have ex-
plained it, “broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence 
in the lives of all Americans”208—they are positioned to enjoy a “broad-
casting monopoly”209 and are thus subject to government rules in a way other 
speakers are not.210  Because there are only a limited number of frequencies 
(or channels), the idea is that regulation is necessary “to ensure the audience 
 
202. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969). 
203. Id. at 377–79. 
204. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff’d, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
205. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
206. Id. at 375. 
207. Even in 1969, the Red Lion plaintiffs argued to the Court that advances in technology made 
broadcast-spectrum scarcity not so scarce anymore and rendered the FCC regulation obsolete.  Brief 
for Respondents Radio Television News Directors Association et al. at 45–46, Red Lion, 395 U.S. 
367 (No. 717) (“Whatever the validity of the assumption that a radio audience had few stations 
among which to choose in 1929, it has been outmoded by radical changes in technology.”).  But 
Justice White did not agree: “Scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past,” he explained, and it is 
“unwise to speculate on the future allocation of that [broadcast] space.”  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396, 
399. 
208. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
209. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that fears of broadcasting monopoly are dated). 
210. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 399 (justifying Congress’s special regulation of the broadcasting 
industry because of the industry’s growing importance and the scarcity of available broadcasting 
frequencies). 
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receives an uninhibited marketplace of ideas and a diversity of view-
points.”211 
Since 1969, the “spectrum scarcity rationale” has been invoked by the 
FCC to support broadcast regulation more generally—well beyond the fair-
ness doctrine (a rule in fact that has long since been repealed).212  Indeed, at 
least some have said the Red Lion rationale serves as a “bedrock for valuable 
telecommunications policy” generally including media ownership limits, 
must-carry rights, and even allocation of broadcast licenses to favor universal 
service.213 
Red Lion has also been subject to repeated criticism and challenges over 
the years—specifically with claims that it is out-of-date.214  With the advent 
of cable television, satellite television, HD radio, and the Internet (to name 
but a few advances in technology), many observers and litigants claim that 
the scarcity justification for broadcast regulation has met its constitutional 
shelf life.215  These critics say “[n]ow, 45 years after Red Lion, scarcity is a 
relic,”216 and that “[f]rom the outset . . . the scarcity doctrine was on a 
collision course with the future.”217 
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to credit these claims, despite 
several invitations to do just that (complete with empirical evidence on the 
factual changes buttressing their claims).218  In 1984, for example, the Court 
explained, “We are not prepared . . . to reconsider our longstanding approach 
without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological develop-
ments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast 
 
211. Josephine Soriano, Note, The Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is It Time to 
Reevaluate Red Lion’s Scarcity Rationale?, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 341 (2006). 
212. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, GEN. DOCKET NO. 83-484, JOINT STATEMENT OF COMMIS-
SIONER SUSAN NESS AND COMMISSIONER GLORIA TRISTANI CONCERNING THE POLITICAL 
EDITORIAL AND PERSONAL ATTACK RULES 21 (1998), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Ness/States/ 
stsn819.pdf [http://perma.cc/2E5M-ZPCT]. 
213. Brief in Opposition at 27, Media General, Inc. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012) (Nos. 11-691, 
11-696, 11-698), 2012 WL 748421, at *27. 
214. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 51, 53 (2010) (criticizing the continued influence of Red Lion in modern 
jurisprudence in part due to the vast advances in technology that have been made since Red Lion 
was decided in 1969). 
215. In cases over the years challenging various forms of FCC broadcast regulation, plaintiffs 
claim that the constitutional shelf life is up.  See, e.g., Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc. et 
al. at 37, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 
3153438, at *37 (“Whatever its validity when Red Lion affirmed it in 1969, . . . today the scarcity 
rationale is totally, surely, and finally defunct.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Minority 
Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014) (No. 13-1124), 2014 WL 1090035, at *15 
(arguing that broadcast regulation has a “limited shelf life”). 
216. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 215, at 15, 2014 WL 1090035, at *15. 
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Media General, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 63 (Nos. 11-691, 11-
696, 11-698), 2011 WL 6069620, at *17. 
218. Soriano, supra note 211, at 352–54. 
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regulation may be required.”219  And in cases involving FCC profanity fines 
in 2009 and 2012, the Court was pressed by the parties to overrule Red Lion 
and to find a constitutional expiration date for broadcast regulations gener-
ally, but it did not budge.220 
These calls for change do not generally ask for a modification in our 
understanding of the First Amendment or even for a change in the standard 
of review due to broadcast regulations.  Rather, they claim that the passage 
of time means “the First Amendment balance struck in Red Lion would look 
different today.”221  And yet, unlike Shelby County, a majority of the Supreme 
Court has (to date) shown no interest in refereeing this particular claim of 
constitutional expiration. 
2. Virtual Child Pornography.—A second example of First Amendment 
doctrine that will be affected by time is an example with a twist.  The best 
way to conceptualize it is with a question: If constitutional laws can grow to 
become unconstitutional over time, is the reverse also true?  Can a law be 
unconstitutional at point A, but—using the same doctrinal test—become 
constitutional because facts have changed due to the passage of time?  At 
least some Justices think the answer is yes. 
In 2002, the Supreme Court heard a First Amendment challenge to the 
Child Pornography Protection Act.222  The law banned “virtual child pornog-
raphy,” or pornographic pictures created without actual children.223  The 
Supreme Court invalidated the law as overbroad and a violation of the First 
Amendment,224 but Justice Thomas concurred with an interesting argument: 
There may soon come a day, he predicted, where this now unconstitutional 
law will grow to become constitutional.225  “[T]echnology may evolve,” he 
said, “to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce actual child 
pornography laws because the Government cannot prove that certain por-
 
219. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.11 (1984). 
220. See Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc. et al., supra note 215, at 37–38, 2008 WL 
3153438, at *37–38 (advocating the overruling of Red Lion); Brief for Respondents ABC, Inc. et 
al. at 10–11, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293), 2011 WL 
5373703, at *10–11 (advocating the overruling of Red Lion if it is necessary to deciding the case).  
Justice Thomas concurred in FCC v. Fox Television noting the “dramatic technological advances” 
that have “eviscerated the factual assumptions” in Red Lion.  Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 533 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  He expressed a willingness to revisit Red Lion and added that when 
“‘constitutional issues’ . . . turn on a particular set of factual assumptions, ‘[the] Court must, in order 
to reach sound conclusions, feel free to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with 
facts newly ascertained.’”  Id. at 535 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 
412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
221. Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring). 
222. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002). 
223. Id. at 241. 
224. Id. at 258. 
225. Id. at 259–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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nographic images are of real children.”226  If that happens, the government 
would have a much more compelling reason to regulate virtual child 
pornography as it would become the only way to stop pornography made 
with actual children—and the First Amendment would be satisfied.227 
Note the implications of this reasoning; Justice Thomas presents the 
mirror image of the shelf life question.  An unconstitutional law today could 
become constitutional tomorrow—not because the Constitution changes, but 
because the government interest in the law strengthens by virtue of tech-
nological progress and the passage of time.  If changed circumstances can 
alter a constitutional test and impose a constitutional expiration, it seems the 
reverse should also be true—that is, the effect of time should run both ways. 
Interestingly, Justice Thomas’s words appear to have prompted 
Congressional action.  Congress’s second attempt to regulate virtual child 
pornography—the PROTECT Act of 2003—included some Congressional 
findings on the passage of time, the evolution of technology, and the 
difficulties that afflict child-pornography prosecutions as a consequence.228  
When this new law was before the Court, Justice Souter seemed sympathetic 
to the shelf life argument in his opinion: “Conditions can change, and if 
today’s technology left no other effective way to stop professional and ama-
 
226. Id. at 259.  The technology to which he is referring includes the ability to: 
(1) create computer-generated depictions of children that are indistinguishable from 
those of real children; (2) use parts of images of real children to create a composite 
image that is unidentifiable as a particular child in a way that prevents experts from 
concluding that parts of real children were actually used; or (3) disguise pictures of 
real children being abused by making the image look computer-generated. 
Gray Mateo, The New Face of Child Pornography: Digital Imaging Technology and the Law, 2008 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 178. 
227. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 259.  This argument was pressed to the Court in the briefs.  
See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of the National Center for 
Missing & Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae at 14–15, Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (No. 
00-795), 2001 WL 417664, at *14–15 (“Technology and the Internet have advanced the use and 
production of child pornography in ways that were not available in 1982 or even in 1990.  If we are 
to achieve progress in attacking the growing problem of child pornography and its resulting harms, 
we must be prepared to adapt our responses to meet this very real threat in a world of ‘virtual 
realities.’”). 
228. See Brief for the United States at 49, United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (No. 
06-694), 2007 WL 1724329, at *49 (“Congress made specific legislative findings. . . .  Congress 
found that, ‘[i]n the absence of Congressional action, the difficulties in enforcing the child 
pornography laws will continue to grow increasingly worse,’ as ‘the mere prospect that the 
technology exists to create composite or computer-generated depictions that are indistinguishable 
from depictions of real children will allow defendants who possess images of real children to escape 
prosecution.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(13), 117 Stat. 650, 678 
(2003))); id. app. at 12a (“Evidence submitted to the Congress . . . demonstrates that technology 
already exists to disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make 
depictions of real children appear computer-generated.  The technology will soon exist, if it does 
not already, to computer generate realistic images of children.”). 
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teur pornographers from exploiting children there would be a fair claim that 
some degree of expressive protection had to yield to protect the children.”229 
E. “Undue Burden” & Abortion Restrictions 
The Court’s decisions about abortion are perhaps notoriously embedded 
with factual assumptions vulnerable to change over time.  The trimester 
framework and the viability line in Roe v. Wade,230 for example, were 
criticized almost since their inception for having a limited shelf life.231 
Not surprisingly, the connection between science and abortion doctrine 
has led to a variety of challenges capitalizing on scientific change.232  To date, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not announced any sort of constitutional expira-
tion date for laws regulating abortion—even in light of changes in medi-
cine.233  There is, however, one facet of abortion doctrine that is particularly 
relevant to the present discussion, and it may be headed to the Supreme Court 
in the not-so-distant future. 
Recently enacted laws in several states require all who perform 
abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital.234  These laws are 
justified as a measure to protect a woman’s health in the case of a compli-
 
229. Williams, 553 U.S. at 323 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
230. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
231. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing Roe’s trimester framework as “outmoded”); Dahlia Lithwick, 
Foreword: Roe v. Wade at Forty, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 10 (2013) (noting that “scientific and medical 
advancements are making it clear that arbitrary lines about fetal viability that were drawn in Roe are 
clearly outdated”). 
232. In Justice O’Connor’s words: 
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself.  As the medical 
risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may regulate 
for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth.  As 
medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, 
the point of viability is moved further back toward conception. 
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  For calls that changed facts demand a change in doctrine, see Jennifer M. Miller, 
Understanding Fetal Pain: How Changed Circumstances Demand a Legal Response, 40 CUMB. L. 
REV. 463, 464 (2010); and Nancy R. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 
95 YALE L.J. 639, 640–41 (1986). 
233. I am not counting the change from Roe to Casey in which the Court abandoned the 
trimester framework in favor of the undue burden test.  Granted, the Court rationalized its choice in 
light of medical advances, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870–71 (1992), 
but this is not quite the same thing as finding a once-valid law unconstitutional because of changed 
circumstances. 
234. Sandhya Somashekhar, Admitting-Privileges Laws Have Created High Hurdle for 
Abortion Providers to Clear, WASH. POST, (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/2014/08/10/62554324-1d88-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html [http://perma.cc/J38R-
GVJT].  As this Article goes to print, two cert petitions challenging these laws (from Texas and 
Mississippi) are pending at the U.S. Supreme Court, and Court watchers suspect the Court will 
decide to hear at least one of them.  See Josh Gerstein, 5 Cases to Watch as Supreme Court Term 
Begins, POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2015, 7:41 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/supreme-court-
abortion-obamacare-214400 [http://perma.cc/XU9V-BLSE]. 
LARSEN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2015  4:01 PM 
2015] Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life? 93 
cation.235  But in practice, critics say, these laws have the effect of closing 
clinics (like Planned Parenthood) because either the physicians live too far 
away from the relevant hospital or because the local hospitals do not want to 
grant privileges to abortion doctors for religious or other reasons.236  Plaintiffs 
have challenged these laws as violating the fundamental right to an abortion 
articulated in Roe v. Wade.237 
Since the Casey238 decision in 1992, the doctrinal test employed when-
ever a state restricts abortions is whether the law’s purpose or effect places a 
substantial obstacle—or “undue burden”—in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability.239  This “undue burden” test is one 
that is vulnerable to pressure from changed circumstances over time—
particularly when one thinks about the cumulative effect of abortion laws 
within one geographic area.  A law requiring licenses at local hospitals, for 
example, may or may not amount to a “substantial obstacle” depending on 
how many clinics the law affects and how many locations remain open and 
available to women seeking abortion.  But of course the answer to that 
question will change over time depending on some legal variables (new laws) 
and some nonlegal ones (funding problems). 
This dilemma recently faced a district judge in Alabama, a state that has 
passed one of these licensing laws.240  In granting a request for a temporary 
restraining order enjoining the law, the court explained: 
[T]he law threatens a permanent destabilizing effect on the provision 
of abortions in this State . . . .  The number of abortion clinics in 
Alabama has already dwindled from seven to five in recent years.  
Thus, while the court’s decision today hinges only on the three clinics 
imminently impacted by [the law], the evidence raises the specter of 
an Alabama in which women are unable to exercise this due-process 
right at all.241 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the same argument in a 
similar case even more recently.242  After a 2012 state law required abortion 
providers to have admitting privileges in local hospitals, the lone Mississippi 
abortion clinic faced imminent closure.243  It filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin 
the law, which the district court granted and the state appealed.244 
 
235. Somashekhar, supra note 234. 
236. Id. 
237. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 587–
88 (5th Cir. 2014). 
238. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
239. Id. at 874. 
240. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
241. Id. at 1288; see also Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 
862–63 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (implying a similar argument). 
242. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2014). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 450. 
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Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit—citing circuit precedent—did not 
question the constitutionality of the law as originally enacted.245  Instead, it 
dealt with what it called the “thornier question”—whether the effect of 
closing clinics in Mississippi and neighboring states created a “domino 
effect” and established an undue burden over time.246 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately decided to grant the temporary restraining 
order, but it noted the difficult soothsaying task it was being asked to 
perform:  
It would be exceedingly difficult for courts to engage in an as-applied 
analysis of an abortion restriction if we were required to consider not 
only the effect on abortion clinics in the regulating state, but also the 
law, potential changes in the law, and locations of abortion clinics in 
neighboring states.247  
And yet the applicable doctrinal test—is there a substantial obstacle in 
a woman’s ability to get an abortion?—is necessarily one that can change 
over time and lead to a constitutional shelf life for the law in question. 
F. Congressional Power: Marijuana 
My final example of a potential constitutional shelf life concerns 
Congress’s power to regulate marijuana.  In lawsuits across the country plain-
tiffs are claiming, in a nutshell, that the forty-five-year-old congressional 
decision to list marijuana as a Schedule I drug is antiquated and thus 
unconstitutional.248  These litigants have built records attempting to docu-
ment the medicinal benefits and exaggerated dangers of marijuana, and they 
are all seeking to expose this aspect of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 
as out-of-date.249  Because we now know much more about marijuana, the 
argument goes, courts should conclude the old law is irrational, beyond the 
scope of Congress’s power, or otherwise constitutionally deficient.250  As one 
 
245. Id. at 453–54. 
246. Id. at 454; id. at 465 n.14 (Garza, J., dissenting); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 20–21, 
Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (No. 13-60599), 2014 WL 407737, at *20–21. 
247. Currier, 760 F.3d at 456 n.8. 
248. See, e.g., Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 552 F. App’x 680, 683 (9th Cir. 
2014) (addressing the argument that the federal prohibition on medical marijuana has no rational 
basis anymore); Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (same); 
Kadonsky v. Holder, No. (UNA), 2014 WL 2739303, at *1 (D.D.C. June 10, 2014) (addressing the 
argument that marijuana does not meet the requirements for classification under 21 U.S.C. § 811); 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, supra note 31, at 12–28, 
2013 WL 10629793 (arguing that medical evidence proves marijuana’s classification unreasonable 
and arbitrary). 
249. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
30, at 18–21, 2012 WL 1580711. 
250. Challenges like this wear various constitutional stripes.  Plaintiffs argue that banning 
marijuana is no longer rational and is therefore a violation of substantive due process, that banning 
marijuana violates equal protection rights of the terminally ill, and that Tenth Amendment and 
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plaintiff puts it, “[l]aws are written then circumstances change and those laws 
must bow to those changes.”251  For this point some recent briefs even cite 
Shelby County picking up the language that “current burdens must be 
justified by current needs.”252  
The Supreme Court has seen this argument about marijuana before, if 
only tangentially.  In 2005, the Court decided Gonzales v. Raich,253 in which 
it held that Congress was permitted under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
homegrown marijuana used for medicinal purposes.254  In that litigation, as 
Justice Stevens credited in a footnote, the plaintiffs and their amici proffered 
evidence of marijuana’s positive medicinal qualities, of the weakness in the 
case for the drug’s dangerousness, and of the changes in medical research 
that had brought this new knowledge to light.255 
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that over time this type of 
evidence may “cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require 
marijuana to be listed in Schedule I.”256  But, he continued, “the possibility 
that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no relevance to the question 
whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and 
distribution.”257 
It may not have been enough for the Court in 2005, but plaintiffs ten 
years later—armed with Shelby County—claim that the expiration date for 
marijuana’s Schedule I classification has in fact arrived.258  These litigants 
not only point out the changed facts about our current understanding of 
marijuana’s effects on the body, but they also argue that as states begin to 
legalize the drug, the federal government’s argument for containing it 
diminishes.259  As Will Baude has argued, the CSA’s broad prohibitions are 
justified only because of the “potential spillovers from the in-state market to 
 
Commerce Clause limitations prevent Congress from regulating marijuana, which should be left to 
the states.  For an example of a brief with all of the above arguments, see id. 
251. Id. at 1. 
252. E.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, supra note 
31, at 31. 
253. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
254. Id. at 22. 
255. See id. at 27 n.37 (acknowledging that the evidence from the litigation may cast doubt on 
marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance); Brief Amici Curiae for the California Nurses 
Association and the DKT Liberty Project in Support of Respondents at 15, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336548, at *15 (“[I]n the 1980’s, medical research began to resurface, 
suggesting that in fact, cannabis did have some specific therapeutic usefulness . . . .”); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Institute for Justice in Support of Respondents at 9, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454), 
2004 WL 2336487, at *9 (observing that the CSA does not “provide any evidence about either the 
universal dangers of marijuana or the necessary interdependence between a specialized local market 
and the general trafficking of marijuana”). 
256. Raich, 545 U.S. at 27 n.37. 
257. Id. 
258. See supra note 248. 
259. See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text. 
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the interstate market.”260  This, of course, changes as states legalize the drug.  
Baude argues that “[s]ometimes a law is constitutionally justified specifically 
because of certain real-world conditions . . . .  If the real-world conditions go 
away, so does the justification.”261 
Interestingly, once again, a key feature of these arguments in the lower 
courts is the position of the Executive.  By law, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), in consultation with Health and Human Services is 
authorized to switch the Schedule classification of a controlled substance 
after notice and comment rulemaking.262  In recent years advocacy groups 
petitioned the agency to change the classification of marijuana from a 
Schedule I drug to a less restrictive Schedule.263  Their petition included 
dozens of medical reports and empirical studies emphasizing the change in 
what we know about marijuana’s effects on the body.264 
In 2011, however, the DEA denied this request—crediting different 
scientific evidence that emphasized marijuana’s risk of abuse and lack of 
accepted medical utility in the United States.265  This administrative finding 
has subsequently played a role in the lower court cases where plaintiffs argue 
for a constitutional shelf life to the CSA’s treatment of marijuana.266  In one 
recent case, for example, the government cited the DEA’s decision to argue 
that whether marijuana should be criminalized given current evidence on the 
drug is a “thorny question” assigned to “the expert agencies” and not the 
province of courts to decide at all.267 
 
*** 
 
In sum, allegations that a law is too old to remain constitutional are not 
new and are not confined to election law.  These claims cut across constitu-
tional doctrines and are evaluated through the lens of several different stan-
dards of review.  Outside of Shelby County (and a strong suggestion in the 
 
260. William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 513, 520 (2015). 
261. Id. at 532. 
262. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)–(b) (2012). 
263. Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 441–42 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
264. Id. at 442. 
265. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 
40,552 (July 8, 2011).  This ruling was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Americans for Safe Access v. 
DEA, 706 F.3d at 452. 
266. See, e.g., Government’s Supplemental Brief at 3, United States v. Pickard, No. 2:11-cr-
449, (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) (referencing the administrative finding to show that these decisions 
have not typically been made by courts); Defendants’ Reply In Support of Motion to Dismiss at 10 
& n.8, Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 
2:11-CV-02939), 2012 WL 1580710 (arguing that the DEA administrative process is the exclusive 
way marijuana could be reclassified). 
267. Government’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 266, at 3. 
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D.C. rent control case), the Supreme Court has never struck down a law on 
this basis, but it has been more receptive to some arguments (as in the 
crack/cocaine example) than others (as in immigration or marijuana).  Is the 
question of constitutional staleness capable of principled application? 
III.  Concerns about the Constitutional Shelf-Life Inquiry 
It should shock no one that the idea of statutory staleness is subject to 
manipulation.  A realist might argue that whether or not a court is swayed by 
the argument that “times have changed” may be best explained by whether 
the judges cared about the underlying law to begin with.  On this view, Justice 
Black did not lose sleep about the burdens imposed on the railroads by the 
full-crew law, but Chief Justice Roberts cared very much about subjecting 
Southern states to more stringent voting discrimination remedial measures. 
Cries of opportunistic judicial behavior, of course, are not unique to the 
issue of a shelf life.  In constitutional law alone, the Court has been accused 
of manipulating standards of review,268 strategically choosing when to defer 
to Congress,269 and conveniently deciding to either follow or hollow 
precedent.270  Why not just add the strategic recognition of the effects of time 
to the list?  On this view, the possibility of a shelf life should cause no more 
concern than any other facet of constitutional law and any other aspect of 
judicial review. 
But there is something new to fret about—some concerns that are unique 
to the concept of a shelf life and that are worth pausing to consider 
independently. 
After the Shelby County decision was announced, William Consovoy 
(one of the County’s lawyers) called the decision “modest, not 
 
268. See William D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond 
the Rules, 44 LOY. L. REV. 889, 891 (2011) (“Justice Stevens was a well-known skeptic of rigid 
rules in equal protection and First Amendment law, among other subjects.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal 
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2002) (arguing “that existing accounts of equal 
protection leave the decision whether to treat a classification as suspect . . . to almost completely 
unguided normative judgment”). 
269. See William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and 
Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 881 (2013) (explaining the divergent 
approaches on legislative facts and acknowledging that “[c]ynics can easily rationalize the divergent 
results by referring to the politics”); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 19, at 76–77 (“[T]he Court 
has been unable to formulate a consistent approach towards Congress’ fact-finding.  Sometimes the 
Court explicitly defers to the facts found by Congress, sometimes it makes an independent judgment 
of the facts, and sometimes it engages in a combination of these approaches.”). 
270. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
1861, 1863 (2014) (noting the criticism the Roberts Court has received due to its willingness to 
“narrow apparently applicable precedents”).  See generally Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. 
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2109, 2111 (2015) (analyzing the current Supreme Court’s tendency to read statutes narrowly to 
opportunistically avoid deciding constitutional questions as a way to “camouflage acts of judicial 
aggression”). 
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revolutionary.”271  Not only did the Court avoid deciding whether the 
preclearance regime was within Congress’s power, he said, but it also only 
found the formula to be irrational because it was outdated.272  The Court “left 
for another day,” Consovoy emphasized, “the question of whether 
congressional findings of discrimination could lead to the exact same set of 
jurisdictions to be covered under an alternative formula.”273 
This claim picks up themes from the Court’s opinion itself.  In Richard 
Hasen’s words, Shelby County “purports to be a modest decision written with 
reluctance and humility.”274  The majority spends very little time discussing 
the Fifteenth Amendment and its history or modern significance.  And it did 
not clearly articulate what standard of review applies to Congress’s choices 
in the Voting Rights Act.  Evading those big fights, the majority opinion 
instead focuses on the dramatic changes since the law was enacted—
including a chart demonstrating the changes in minority voter turnout over 
the last fifty years.275  The Court addresses not whether Congress can do this 
at all, but whether Congress can do it without an update.276  In the Court’s 
words, “We cannot pretend that we are reviewing an updated statute, or try 
our hand at updating the statute ourselves, based on the new record compiled 
by Congress. . . . [Congress’s] failure to act leaves us today with no choice 
but to declare [the law] unconstitutional.”277  And then, in conclusion, the 
opinion emphasized that “Congress may draft another formula based on 
current conditions.”278 
These choices are deliberate and revealing.  Arguments that laws are 
outdated—like the one credited in Shelby County—emphasize facts over 
doctrine.  And this change in focus has very significant implications. 
First, finding a law to be unconstitutional because it is outdated as a fac-
tual matter sounds somehow more objective, more scientific, and less polit-
ically motivated than second-guessing a legislative policy choice.  The Court 
did not need to find that Congress was without power to pass the Voting 
 
271. NATHANIEL PERSILY & THOMAS MANN, SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 5 (2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2013/08/09-shelby-v-holder-policy-mann/persily_mann_shelby-county-v-holder-policy-
brief_v9.pdf  [http://perma.cc/88Y4-UB3N]. 
272. See id. (explaining that “the Court ruled against the coverage formula on grounds that it 
was not rational in theory” because the data was from the 1960s and 1970s, not because the Court 
decided that the geographic scope was irrational). 
273. Id. 
274. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 713, 713 (2014).  Hasen then argues that “[d]espite the projected judicial modesty, the Shelby 
County Court was doing much more than calling balls and strikes.”  Id. at 714. 
275. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–26 (2013). 
276. See id. at 2629 (“But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not use the 
record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions.  It instead reenacted 
a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”). 
277. Id. at 2629, 2631. 
278. Id. at 2631. 
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Rights Act; it only needed to hold that it couldn’t do it with an outdated mech-
anism.  For Justices who call themselves minimalists and pride themselves 
on respecting legislative policy choices, this is a very attractive rationale. 
Faulting Congress for using old numbers is tempting for any number of 
reasons.  It is an argument that can be described with charts and data.  In a 
legal culture that has long equated science with legitimacy,279 this is a most 
appealing option.  Moreover, it avoids having to wrestle with thorny doctrinal 
issues such as precisely identifying or applying a standard of review.  And—
what is more—the consequences of the ruling can be remedied if Congress 
ever gets its act together.  This sounds like minimalism.  The Court is not 
changing what the Constitution means; it is merely addressing changed facts 
and calling things like it sees them.  This “just the facts, ma’am” strategy is 
attractive because it appears judicially modest. 
But this modesty of course is just an illusion.  Deciding that the Voting 
Rights Act formula is too old to be rational as a factual matter is just as 
consequential as holding that the law exceeded Congressional power as we 
now understand the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Recall that Justice Black put “findings of fact” in scare quotes when he 
denounced what he called the judicial indulgence in a legislative call about 
the proper size of railroad crews.280  What he was alluding to was the 
temptation to make big changes in the law through so-called modest findings 
of fact.  It is a risk highlighted in Shelby County, but it is a danger inherent 
simply in the idea of a constitutional expiration date. 
If this temptation is true for certain Justices about the Voting Rights Act, 
it could be true for other Justices about, for example, marijuana laws.  It is 
not difficult to imagine a judicial opinion one day—complete with charts—
that carefully describes the state of our understanding about the dangers of 
marijuana in 1975 compared with our understanding about the drug today.  
Particularly in a post-Internet world where facts are so easy to access on all 
sides of a debate, this type of argument would not be difficult to make.  There 
would be no need to find four votes agreeing on the scope of federal power 
under the Commerce Clause or defining fundamental rights.  A constitutional 
shelf life only requires a consensus that “times have changed” . . . which, of 
course, they always do. 
My argument, therefore, is not that stale facts are easier to manipulate 
than any other choice before the Court.  My claim is that it is dangerous to 
pretend that they are any better.  This particular manipulation comes in a 
modest façade that belies the importance of what is actually happening.  Put 
 
279. See Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 
111, 116 (1997) (“By reciting scientific facts, the Court shows why its rulings are in harmony with 
a culture that accords legitimacy to findings made by scientists.”). 
280. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 
U.S. 129, 139 (1968). 
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simply, as constitutional law becomes increasingly steeped in factual claims, 
we must guard against the understandable temptation to see everything as a 
question of fact—refutable, objective, and almost scientific.  That use of the 
factual label translates to a very robust brand of judicial power. 
Of course, recognizing changed facts affects more than just claims that 
a law has expired.  As articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, sometimes the Court uses changed facts to justify a 
turn in constitutional doctrine.281  The Casey Court explained that a precedent 
can be overruled if “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, 
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”282 
Why should one be nervous about using facts to invalidate a law because 
it is too old but not concerned with using facts to justify a constitutional 
change in meaning?  In other words, if one is comfortable with the Justices 
knowing that the world has changed such that our reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause must change (like from Plessy283 to Brown), should not that 
same confidence extend to claims of a constitutional shelf life? 
My answer is a very pragmatic one.  Shifts in our understanding of the 
Constitution are a big deal.  They do not happen often, and when they occur, 
everyone—all members of the Court and all of the Court watchers—is aware 
of the historic significance of the decision at hand. 
With the heightened significance that accompanies shifts in understand-
ing the Constitution comes a natural prudence.  As the discussion in Casey 
keenly demonstrates, when debating a change in the Constitution’s meaning, 
the Justices are at their most vulnerable—they are concerned with their own 
legitimacy in the public eye.  This context explains why the Casey Court—
when asked to overrule Roe v. Wade and knowing that the whole country was 
watching—decided to opine on the nature of stare decisis and concerns about 
its institutional legitimacy.  Overruling a precedent or announcing that the 
Constitution’s meaning has changed is extremely significant—for the 
Justices as individuals, for the Court as an institution, and for the country.  
The scale of the responsibility serves as a form of restraint.  The Court will 
not easily hold, in other words, that “[s]ociety’s understanding of the facts” 
relevant to constitutional interpretation has changed.284 
By contrast, when the Justices are not poised to consider a change in the 
Constitution’s meaning, but are rather just applying a settled meaning to so-
called changed facts, the magnitude of the moment is less apparent and their 
discretion is therefore less constrained. 
To use a colorful analogy, this is like breaking up with a person by 
saying one needs more time to focus on work.  It is the easier way out.  The 
 
281. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–64 (1992). 
282. Id. at 855. 
283. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
284. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863. 
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outcome is the same—Section Five of the Voting Rights Act is essentially a 
dead letter without the formula—but the way to reach that outcome appears 
more conservative because it is something judges have done from the 
beginning of time; it is “just” the application of new facts to settled law.  And 
like the heartbreaker in my analogy, finding a law to be outdated is a much 
easier judicial move than the more difficult task of finding the meaning of 
the Constitution to have changed over time.  Even if it is easier to accomplish 
and easier to stomach, however, striking down a law because it is premised 
on outdated facts carries equally significant implications for judicial review 
and constitutional law in the future. 
IV.  Conditions Necessary for a Court to Find a Constitutional Shelf Life 
I am not the first person to worry about the implications of a 
constitutional shelf life.  Lower courts faced with these claims commonly 
display a sense of unease and vulnerability—how is one to tell whether a law 
is too outdated?285 
If I am correct that the opportunity and the temptation to make these 
claims will only grow, it seems imperative to develop some sort of 
framework to guide judicial discretion in how to deal with them.  As Corrina 
Lain put it recently, “[c]onstitutional decisionmaking comes down to 
judgment calls, and those judgment calls have to come from somewhere.”286  
Is there any way to guide judicial discretion on the question of a shelf life?  
Can a court measure factual change in any principled way? 
Below I offer preliminary thoughts on an answer.  I first claim that the 
answer to the shelf-life question must be guided by the applicable level of 
scrutiny.  The possibility of constitutional expiration should be present only 
when a court is applying a form of heightened scrutiny.  I argue that on 
rationality review, the prospect of a constitutional shelf life should be off the 
table.  Then, even on a stricter standard of review, I point to two indicators 
(taken from the cases collected above) that the factual change is enough to 
change the constitutional status of a law: (1) when an agency has recognized 
the changed circumstances first, and (2) when the factual dispute is not 
subject to an ongoing political process.  While neither barometer for gauging 
constitutional expiration is perfect, there are significant benefits to 
recognizing each as a limiting principle. 
 
 
285. E.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
286. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 
365, 405 (2009). 
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A. Importance of the Standard of Review 
Recall in the crack/cocaine example discussed above, Judge Calabresi 
contemplated the possibility of a constitutional shelf life and candidly 
lamented the lack of manageable standards to apply.287  Ultimately he hung 
his hat on the standard of review: he voted to dismiss the defendant’s claim 
for a constitutional shelf life on rationality review, even though he indicated 
a different result might follow if strict scrutiny applied.288 
Judge Calabresi was correct to rely on the standard of review in this 
way.  To be sure, standards of review are not perfect constraints on discretion.  
As others have argued, they are used at best unpredictably and at worst 
opportunistically.289  But as Justice Souter once explained, having different 
rules for review “keeps the starch” in the law.290  Put differently (and less ele-
gantly), although the guidance and restraint supplied by levels of review are 
not perfect by any means, the self-control they embody is necessary to further 
the rule of law. 
In looking for guidance on the shelf-life question, therefore, the various 
standards of review should be the first place to start.  There are at least two 
reasons why this must be true.  First, considering a constitutional shelf life 
will necessarily require a careful review of the legislative factual record at 
question.  Determining how carefully a court, in the words of Justice Scalia 
“check[s] Congress’s homework,”291 should be guided by whether the level 
of scrutiny is ratcheted up.  “If a particular doctrine reflects judicial suspicion 
of legislative action,” as Bill Araiza helpfully explains, “then that suspicion 
should extend to the legislature’s findings supporting its chosen policy.”292 
Some constitutional tests, by their own terms, require increased fact-
checking judicial oversight.  It is hard to rule on whether a law is an undue 
 
287. Then, 56 F.3d at 468. 
288. Id. at 466–68. 
289. As Michael Dorf has argued (in the specific context of Equal Protection doctrine), deciding 
which standard of review applies is left “to almost completely unguided normative judgment,” 
leaving us with a “messy hodgepodge” that is “highly subjective.”  Dorf, supra note 268, at 954, 
966–67. 
290. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
291. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining 
about the “flabby” congruence and proportionality test applied when Congress is using its enforce-
ment power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
292. Araiza, supra note 269, at 900.  There is a growing literature on when the Court should 
defer to Congressional findings of fact, and that is a topic too large and too complicated to be 
adequately addressed here.  That being said, however, I am not the first to claim that the substantive 
constitutional doctrine should play an important role in the level of deference to Congressional fact-
finding.  See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 129–30 (claiming that the amount of deference given 
to Congressional fact-finding should track the level of judicial review applied to the kind of law at 
issue); Borgmann, supra note 19, at 35 (“Independent judicial review of constitutionally-significant 
facts goes in tandem with the importance of judicial review more generally when basic personal 
liberties are at issue.”). 
LARSEN.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2015  4:01 PM 
2015] Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life? 103 
burden or not, for example, without some decision about the facts—including 
changed facts.  Similarly, the “one person one vote” standard in voting 
reapportionment cases demands inquiry into changed factual circumstances.  
What else would you call a test that turns on population changes?  And the 
“congruent and proportional” test that applies when Congress is exercising 
its enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
likewise requires some sort of judicial “homework checking” of the factual 
record (which is why Justice Scalia calls the test “flabby” and hard to 
apply).293 
What all of these tests have in common is that they are all a form of 
heightened scrutiny.  They each empower a court to look under the hood of 
the law, so to speak, and to check the factual underpinnings.  But without that 
doctrinal permission, I submit, a court is not authorized to check the home-
work of the legislature.  Finding a law to have outgrown its rationality on a 
baseline minimal rationality review, therefore, should be out of bounds. 
A second reason for this line in the sand is that a more forgiving standard 
of review generally establishes that the political process is still functioning.  
In the present context, this means that the legislature can recognize the 
changed facts and address them in future legislation.  Don’t cry for the funeral 
directors in Pennsylvania, in other words, because they can bring their 
grievances to the Pennsylvania legislature. 
By contrast, when a heightened scrutiny applies, one rationale for the 
tough standard of review is that there is reason to believe the political process 
is broken, at least for some people.  The significance of that here is that there 
is a decreased chance the legislature will recognize the changed circum-
stances on its own, perhaps justifying judicial interference.  Those chal-
lenging an abortion law, for example, may have difficulty bringing the 
changed circumstances to the attention of the legislature; at least, that is part 
of the justification for the heighted judicial standard that applies when their 
claims are addressed. 
B. Two Indications that a Law’s Factual Premise Has Grown Stale 
Putting weight on the standard of review, however, is just a beginning.  
There is still very little guidance for a court as to how to measure changed 
facts that might justify a constitutional shelf life.  A vacuum of standards is 
dangerous and unhelpful.  But if just looking at the factual record alone is not 
enough, how is a court to determine when a law is too antiquated, even on a 
heightened standard of review? 
Two patterns emerge in the cases that have confronted the shelf-life 
question to date.  First, courts seem more willing to credit the “times have 
changed” argument when it is following the Executive’s lead—when an 
 
293. Lane, 541 U.S. at 557–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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administrative agency has considered the shelf-life claim first.  Second, 
courts seem less willing to find a law constitutionally out-of-date when the 
controversy has been subject to a prolonged political dialogue. 
1. Role of the Executive.—Courts are not the only government entity 
capable of recognizing changed circumstances.  As Jody Freeman and David 
Spence observed recently, administrative agencies are commonly tasked with 
implementing old statutes to address new problems.294  Agencies perform 
quite well in these circumstances and, according to Freeman and Spence, 
manage these statutory-fit problems carefully, strategically, and often with 
deliberate restraint.295  Particularly in an era with a polarized and often 
inactive Congress, federal agencies are the best “statutory updaters” because 
“they are more nimble than Congress, more accountable than courts, and 
more expert than both in responding to changing conditions.”296 
If agencies can be trusted to “update” statutes, in the words of Freeman 
and Spence, perhaps they can also serve as a guide to courts struggling with 
claims that a law is unconstitutionally out-of-date.  I think this deference not 
only makes sense for functional reasons, but it is also consistent with the way 
most federal courts have dealt with claims of constitutional expiration in the 
past.297 
Recall two examples discussed above: the 100-to-1 crack/cocaine 
sentencing disparity and the listing of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled 
substance.  Both laws have been subject not just to lawsuits alleging consti-
tutional expiration but also to review of the changed circumstances by 
administrative agencies.  In both contexts, the respective agency’s position 
has greatly influenced the judicial answer to the constitutional question. 
In Kimbrough v. United States, for example, when contemplating the 
validity of the old 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and cocaine 
offenders, the Supreme Court was influenced by the “additional research and 
experience” that the U.S. Sentencing Commission brought to bear on the 
controversy.298  It was critical to the Court that the federal agency charged 
with establishing sentencing policy and practices thought the old law to be 
problematic, and that this conclusion was reached only after the agency 
 
294. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–
3 (2014). 
295. Id. at 3. 
296. Id. at 4. 
297. Judicial deference to the Executive with respect to evaluating old laws is nothing new.  In 
addition to the examples discussed above, the old English doctrine of desuetude forbids criminal 
prosecution under an old law when enforcement has been exceedingly rare.  See Dan T. Coenen, 
The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2835, 2849–50 (2009) (citing desuetude as an explanation for the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of Texas’s sodomy ban in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
298. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97 (2007). 
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devoted much time and several lengthy fact-laden reports to reexamining the 
Congressional assumptions behind the old law.299 
Similarly—although this dispute has yet to reach the Supreme Court—
the lower courts tasked with determining whether it is constitutional to list 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug anymore have looked to the Executive with a 
deferential eye.300  The executive position on marijuana is complicated.  As 
noted above, the Drug Enforcement Agency has considered and declined to 
remove marijuana from the list of Schedule I controlled substances.301  
However, in a series of memos beginning in 2009, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has issued guidance to federal prosecutors not to waste resources pros-
ecuting individuals who are complying with state laws regarding marijuana 
(although maintaining that federal law is still supreme in this regard).302 
Together these directives seem like an incremental step to react to 
changed circumstances about marijuana.  And the courts seem almost 
relieved to let the Executive take the lead on this issue.  To date, no court has 
credited the claim that marijuana restrictions are constitutionally outdated.  
Instead, the typical move is for the court to explicitly defer to executive 
discretion on marijuana enforcement, sometimes examining these DOJ 
memorandums on the subject line by line.303 
I do not mean to suggest that the question of when a law has 
constitutionally expired is a question that can or should be answered entirely 
by an administrative agency.  I make instead the more limited claim that in 
evaluating a challenge to an old law as constitutionally extinct, a court should 
 
299. Id. at 97–98. 
300. See, e.g., Ams. For Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 449–52 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (deferring 
to DEA’s interpretation of “adequate and well-controlled studies” in the Schedule I context). 
301. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 
40,562 (July 8, 2011). 
302. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Selected U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7DCJ2U7S] (stating that federal prosecutors should not “focus federal resources . . . 
on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for medical use of marijuana” but also stating that “no state can authorize violations of 
federal law”); see also Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685 
7467.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RVX-TVZT] (directing federal prosecutors to “review marijuana cases 
on a case-by-case basis” weighing “whether the [marijuana] operation is demonstrably in 
compliance with a strong and effective state regulatory system”); Memorandum from James M. 
Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Att’ys (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice 
.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7Y8C-KV55] (affirming the Ogden Memo and clarifying that it did not apply to 
“large-scale, privately-operated industrial marijuana cultivation centers,” even when “those 
[centers] purport to comply with state law”). 
303. E.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090–91 (D. Mont. 2012); 
Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1111–12 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Mont. 
Caregivers Ass’n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 (D. Mont. 2012). 
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look to an agency’s enforcement position as a clue for measuring the 
magnitude of the factual change on the ground. 
Recall this is exactly the Court’s position with respect to broadcast 
scarcity and the FCC.  When asked to overrule Red Lion, the Court has said: 
“We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach 
without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological devel-
opments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast 
regulation may be required.”304 
Perhaps this intuition is more than just a convenient reason to punt.  
When the Sentencing Commission recommends changing the sentence for 
crack users because time has revealed an unfair burden on racial minorities, 
that recommendation comes after a rather intense and deliberate fact-finding 
process—one that agencies are in a far better position to undertake than 
courts given the time constraints of litigation and the resource constraints of 
the federal bench.  The Court has used—and should continue to use—the 
factually supported determinations of the Executive as a guidepost in deter-
mining when exactly times have changed. 
2. Legislative Sensitivity to Effects of Time.—A second trend in the 
Court’s discussion of constitutional expiration dates is attention to how the 
legislation in question deals or is dealing with the effects of time.  Recall that 
Justice Black, in evaluating the law on the size of a railroad crew, emphasized 
that the issue had been subject to “frequent and recent legislative re-
evaluation.”305  And Justice White (in Vance v. Bradley) rejected the con-
stitutional challenge to the Foreign Service retirement age because Congress 
“has gone to great lengths” to consider this issue and had revisited it twice 
“[i]n the intervening years.”306 
Certainly a legislature cannot design its law to fully protect it from 
constitutional challenge later.  But there are ways that a law can have 
temporal limitations built into it—it can display a legislative sensitivity to 
changes that will come.  And when that is true, it should be treated as a sign 
to the court that the political process is healthy and capable of tinkering with 
the underlying problem on its own. 
These legislative temporal limitations can take one of several forms.  
First, and perhaps most obvious, some laws contain sunset provisions.  A 
sunset provision is when a legislature sets its own expiration date—a clause 
in the statute stating the law will cease to have effect after a certain date.307 
 
304. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984). 
305. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 
U.S. 129, 134 (1968). 
306. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 104, 106 (1979). 
307. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1777, 1779 (2013) (referring to sunset provisions as an “expiration date”). 
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Sunset clauses have their critics and are used for a number of reasons 
(some positive and some less so), but at least one reason for a sunset is to 
force legislative reevaluation of policies in the case of changed circum-
stances.308  The existence of a sunset provision thus signals that the legislature 
assumed time may change its assumptions and that it wants to be the one to 
address any subsequent shifts at a later date. 
A second way for a legislature to address the effects of time is through 
factual findings.  A good example here is the previously discussed PROTECT 
Act of 2003 concerning virtual child pornography.309  In that law, Congress 
made factual findings forecasting the effect of time on laws targeting child 
pornography.310  Specifically, it found that technology would soon exist to 
create realistic but purely digital images of children.311  With this finding, 
Congress thus recognized that the constitutional evaluation of its law would 
change over time (the government’s interest in the law would strengthen), 
and it attempted to predict and weigh in on how that calculation should be 
made.312 
A third and final way for a legislature to embed in its law sensitivity to 
the effects of time is to structure the law so that it can adjust to changing 
conditions.  Justice Ginsburg has referred to this feature of a law as having a 
dynamic design.313  An example of this is the Controlled Substances Act.314  
The CSA explicitly authorizes a federal agency (the DEA) to change the 
classification of a drug after notice and comment rulemaking.315  This admin-
istrative process can be initiated by either the government or any interested 
party, and it can happen more than once over the course of time.316  Indeed, 
in 1988 the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws 
obtained a successful ruling from an administrative law judge about reclas-
 
308. See id. at 1781 (“Sunsets are thus employed as a mechanism to force Congress to 
reevaluate policies when the crisis atmosphere and, presumably, its accompanying pathologies have 
passed.”); Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to Clean 
Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671, 1672–73 (2005) (arguing for sunsets in criminal 
statutes “to aid in the effective and efficient cleanup of the codes, with an aim towards creating a 
criminal code that is current and streamlined”).  But see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009–12 (2011) (warning against sunset clauses and recommending a 
presumption against finding them). 
309. See supra notes 222–29 and accompanying text. 
310. Brief for the United States at 49, United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (No. 06-
694), 2007 WL 1724329, at *49 (detailing the legislative record of the PROTECT Act of 2003). 
311. Id. app. at 14a–15a. 
312. Id. app. at 15a. 
313. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2644 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress 
designed the VRA to be a dynamic statute, capable of adjusting to changing conditions.”). 
314. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
315. Controlled Substances Act § 201(a). 
316. Id. 
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sifying marijuana—a decision that was later overruled by the DEA.317  And 
most recently, in 2011 the DEA reaffirmed its position that marijuana was 
too dangerous to remove from Schedule I classification.318 
Those seeking the legalization of marijuana will likely scoff at the idea 
that this process is truly dynamic; there are vocal critics of the DEA’s refusal 
to roll with the times and liberalize laws on marijuana.319  But the point 
remains that the potential for change exists and is written into the law.  The 
dynamic structure of the law reveals, in other words, a legislative awareness 
that time would affect its present factual assumptions. 
What implications do we take from these three ways a legislature can 
demonstrate sensitivity to changes that will affect its laws over time?  At the 
very least there is a lesson for legislators.  Surely the best remedy for stale 
facts in the law is to have the most democratic branch update its laws period-
ically.  Congress can and perhaps ought to be more attentive to the issue of 
staleness—not necessarily as a constitutional requirement or constraint but 
as an internal concern.320 
More relevant for present purposes, however, is what a court should 
make of a sunset provision, a factual finding speculating into the future, or a 
statute with a dynamic design.  These three characteristics of a law should 
counsel strongly against finding a constitutional shelf life.  When a legislature 
pledges to review the problem in light of changed conditions in the future, or 
at least delegates that job to an agency, that decision should signal a 
legislative intent to be involved in the updating. 
Honoring that legislative intent seems to be motivating many of the 
decisions discussed in this paper.  Perhaps because line drawing is so difficult 
on the question of expiration (as Judge Calabresi lamented in Then321), or 
perhaps because the evidence of factual change is so often mixed (as Justice 
Black pointed out in the railroad cases322), the more cautious judicial decision 
is to avoid a constitutional decision when it seems likely the political 
branches will address the changed circumstances eventually.  When there is 
 
317. Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53,783 (Dec. 29, 
1989). 
318. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 
40,562–63 (July 8, 2011). 
319. See, e.g., Daniel Mortensen, California and Uncle Sam’s Tug-of-War Over Mary Jane Is 
Really Harshing the Mellow, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 127, 166 n.135 (2010) 
(noting that the DEA’s scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I substance is in conflict with the 
opinions of many in the medical health community). 
320. Consider an analogy to the federalism cases beginning in 1995 with United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995).  The Court’s decision in Lopez prompted further detail to Congressional fact-
finding in conjunction with its commerce clause power.  Perhaps Shelby County can prompt a 
similar legislative response with respect to Congressional attention to factual changes over time. 
321. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
322. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 
U.S. 129, 138–39 (1968). 
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a good clue, in other words, that the debate will be updated or at least 
reconsidered by the legislature later, that is a strong reason for a court to stand 
down. 
At the very least, deferring to the legislature in these contexts is more 
consistent with the concept of judicial minimalism—something many of the 
modern Justices purport to embrace.323  In a nutshell, minimalists favor 
“narrow” and “shallow” judicial decisions, as opposed to “wide” and “deep” 
ones.324  The hallmark of judicial minimalism is “the constructive use of 
silence” and the willingness to leave things undecided.325  Leaving the ques-
tion of statutory staleness to the body that enacted the statute to begin with 
may be the slower path to change, but it is the one more consistent with 
minimalism when there are good indications the political dialogue is ongoing 
and will continue.326 
V.  Back to Shelby County 
Finally, we come full circle back to where this Article began: Shelby 
County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  There is room to argue 
about the precise nature of the constitutional violation in Shelby County.  The 
Court was certainly concerned about federalism and the “principle of equal 
sovereignty among the States,”327 but that alone did not cause the statute to 
fall.  The law’s disparate treatment of the states marked the high stakes and 
 
323. Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court 
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 491 (2010); Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads 
Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1046 (2011); 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge’s Mentor: Part Guide, Part Foil, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/us/politics/22mentors.html [http://perma.cc/R4HD-37CQ] 
(portraying Judge Sotomayor as a judicial minimalist and quoting former Yale Law Dean and 
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor’s approach in a controversial case 
as one of “judicial minimalism”); Dahlia Lithwick, Her Honor, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2011), 
http://nymag.com/news/politics/elena-kagan-2011-12/# [https://perma.cc/G22F-3U6E] (“[Justice 
Kagan] is deciding her cases one at a time, without hints or promises about where she may be moved 
down the road.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(July 2, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/ 
77SF-2KPX] (“[A]t present, we can characterize the Roberts Court as a moderately conservative 
minimalist Court (except when its [sic] not).”). 
324. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 10–11 (1999). 
325. Id. at 5. 
326. The connection to minimalism explains, I think, why Justice Holmes did not feel 
constrained by the sunset provision in the D.C. rent control statute at issue in Chastleton Corp. v. 
Sinclair.  As Adrian Vermeule helpfully explains, Justice Holmes did not feel judicial minimalism 
was the correct approach in a time of emergency.  Vermeule, supra note 187, at 164; see also id. at 
192 (explaining that to Holmes a sunset provision is just a “prophecy” to be evaluated later).  At 
least in the case of emergencies, therefore, Justice Holmes thought it was perfectly acceptable for a 
court to discover the end of an emergency—but he did not think this was an act of judicial 
minimalism. 
327. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nw. 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
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the exceptional nature of the preclearance system, but it was not the ultimate 
constitutional flaw in it.328  And although the Court was extensively briefed 
on the scope of Congress’s power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,329 the majority opinion did not decide whether the Voting 
Rights Act was an appropriate use of Congress’s enforcement power under 
those constitutional texts. 
Instead, the constitutional violation in Shelby County had more to do 
with the passage of time than with anything else.  The coverage formula in 
the law, recall, was reauthorized in 2006.330  But, according to the Chief 
Justice, it was reauthorized “as if nothing had changed.”331  “[H]istory,” he 
wrote, “did not end in 1965.”332  Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is based 
on “40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”333  And, 
he concluded, the Constitution requires that “‘current burdens’ must be 
justified by ‘current needs.’”334 
This is the clearest endorsement of a constitutional shelf life the 
Supreme Court has ever articulated.  And the question remains: is it justified?  
Putting aside the broader question of whether a constitutional shelf life is ever 
a good idea, was it appropriately invoked in this case?  Did the coverage 
formula of the Voting Rights Act expire—had its rationality eroded to the 
point where a court is justified in finding it unconstitutional for that reason?  
For me, the answer is a clear no.  Even if one believes in constitutional 
expiration dates theoretically, Shelby County was the wrong place to find one. 
To start, the Shelby County Court employed a form of rationality review.  
Granted, the correct standard of review in this case is a bit of a mystery.  
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act using its enforcement power under 
the Fifteenth Amendment.335  Some say that challenges to this exercise of 
Congressional power should be scrutinized under the “congruence and 
proportionality test” used when Congress exercises enforcement power under 
 
328. See id. at 2624 (recalling that the Court had previously upheld the Voting Rights Act 
against federalism and equal sovereignty challenges because the Act was justified by the “blight of 
racial discrimination in voting” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966))). 
329. E.g., Brief of Reps. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 30–32, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 417739, 
at *30–32. 
330. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(a)(8) (West 2015) (noting the renewal and expiration provisions 
of the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, César E. Chávez, Barbara C. Jordan, 
William C. Velásquez, and Dr. Hector P. Garcia Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amend-
ments Act of 2006). 
331. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626. 
332. Id. at 2628. 
333. Id. at 2629. 
334. Id. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009)). 
335. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment.336  Others say it should only be subjected to a 
“rational basis” standard with the deference typically accorded to acts of 
Congress.337 
The Shelby County Court did not wrestle with this debate and left the 
standard of review for Fifteenth Amendment cases an “open question,”338 but 
the word it chose to use when invalidating the law is “irrational,” leading 
most commentators to conclude it was employing some sort of rationality 
review.339 
This is not your mother’s rationality review, however.  As others have 
argued extensively, Shelby County “defied the deferential nature of the 
rational basis test” by giving short shrift to the legislative record amassed in 
2006.340  If legislative choices are generally given the benefit of the doubt on 
rationality review and—most importantly here—if the factual premise for 
legislation is not given a close look, then Shelby County’s rationality review 
was rationality in name only. 
I am willing to concede that if the Court was applying a heightened 
standard of review, the case for a constitutional shelf life would be stronger 
with respect to the Voting Rights Act.341  But the Shelby County Court must 
have neglected to articulate any heightened scrutiny for a reason.  Perhaps, 
as some have speculated, there were not five votes to decide whether 
Congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment should be scrutinized 
 
336. E.g., Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Winner of American Constitution Society’s National Student 
Writing Competition, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1478–79 (2014) (noting that the court of appeals in Shelby County took 
the Supreme Court’s precedent to be “a powerful signal that congruence and proportionality is the 
appropriate standard of review” for the VRA (quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 
(D.C. Cir. 2012))). 
337. E.g., Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby 
County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 303–04 (2014).  To deepen the mystery, the Court’s 
prior decisions on the Voting Rights Act could support either view.  In South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach the Court spoke in terms of rationality review to review the preclearance scheme in the 
VRA, 383 U.S. at 324, but the decision was later used as an illustration of the congruence and 
proportionality test.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997); Muller, supra, at 304 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment cases treated South Carolina v. Katzenbach as instructive.”). 
338. Muller, supra note 337, at 302. 
339. Id. at 304 (“The Court in Shelby County did not address which test is appropriate for 
Fifteenth Amendment analysis.  The Court’s only expression approaching an articulation of the test 
was twice mentioning that the Act’s coverage formula was ‘irrational.’”); see Greenbaum et al., 
supra note 16, at 826 (“[T]he majority in Shelby County appeared to be applying a rational basis 
test.”). 
340. Greenbaum et al., supra note 16, at 814; see also Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: 
Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 
2061–63 (2014) (surveying the apparent distrust of the legislative record exhibited by the Court in 
Shelby County). 
341. The answer is still not an easy one.  For an argument that preclearance is within congres-
sional authority even in light of the changes in the country since 1965, see generally Pamela S. 
Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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strictly.342  Or perhaps deciding that the law falls under any standard of 
review—without choosing one—can be seen by some as “narrow” decision 
making and “the kind of minimalism one would ordinarily expect” from the 
Chief Justice.343 
If the standards of review mean anything, however, they must mean that 
choosing a deferential standard to avoid a fight still results in applying def-
erence.  And, as I argue above, the choice of rationality review should have 
taken the possibility of a shelf life off the table. 
Even putting aside the standard-of-review question, consider the other 
limiting principles at work in the cases described above: an indication by the 
Executive that the law is outdated and an absence of congressional attention 
to the effects of time.  Both factors point the other way with respect to the 
Voting Rights Act. 
As to the first point, the Department of Justice clearly indicated its view 
that § 4 of the Voting Rights Act continued to be necessary and relevant in 
current times.344  Right up until the law was declared unconstitutional, in fact, 
the Attorney General denied requests by covered jurisdictions to change their 
voting laws.345  The DOJ did not deny that racial progress had been made in 
the covered states since 1965, but concluded that “barriers to minority voting 
would quickly resurface were the preclearance remedy eliminated.”346 
The DOJ also recorded its observations in the legislative record.  It 
informed Congress in 2006 of countless examples of racial discrimination in 
the covered jurisdictions in modern times.347  In fact, as Justice Ginsburg 
observes in her dissent, the DOJ filed “more DOJ objections [to voting 
practices in covered jurisdictions] between 1982 and 2004 . . . than there were 
between 1965 and . . . 1982” when the law was last reauthorized.348  In light 
of these reports, the House concluded, “[d]iscrimination today is more subtle 
than the visible methods used in 1965,” but “the effect and results are the 
same, namely a diminishing of the minority community’s ability to fully 
participate in the electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates.”349 
 
342. Muller, supra note 337, at 305 (observing that Justices Kennedy and Thomas had regularly 
adhered to the congruence and proportionality test, but Justice Scalia had not—calling the test 
“flabby” and void of any real meaning). 
343. Id. at 306. 
344. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2639 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
345. E.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Melody 
Thomas Chappel (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/ 
l_130408.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y2R3-XWUN]. 
346. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); see also City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 181 (1980) (noting Congressional recognition that, though undeniable prog-
ress had been made by the Voting Rights Act, it had been “modest and spotty”). 
347. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing DOJ submissions 
to the legislative record in 2006 reauthorization). 
348. Id. at 2639. 
349. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6 (2006). 
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Regarding the second limiting principle I suggest above—attention to 
the legislative record with respect to the effects of time—the Voting Rights 
Act is once again an unusual place to find a shelf life.  It is not as if Congress 
legislated on voting discrimination in 1965 and, as the Chief Justice implies, 
never touched the subject again.  In fact, the Voting Rights Act as reautho-
rized in 2006 contained all three of the features I discuss above that indicate 
a legislative intention to update the law itself. 
First, in 2006 Congress not only extended the Voting Rights Act in 
response to an earlier sunset provision (actually several different sunset 
provisions that were added and then extended in the intervening years), but 
it included yet another sunset clause, committing itself to reconsider the 
extension after fifteen years (in 2021) to ensure that the provision was still 
necessary and effective.350  Congress thus built in its own temporal limitation 
in the Act. 
Second, as referenced above, the record built in the 2006 reauthorization 
was over 15,000 pages long and contained extensive documentation of 
“continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions.”351  It also contained a 
congressional finding that voting in the covered jurisdictions was more 
racially polarized than elsewhere in the country, and that there was “[a] 
continued need for Federal oversight” in the covered jurisdictions now.352 
Third, in the words of Justice Ginsburg, “Congress designed the VRA 
to be a dynamic statute, capable of adjusting to changing conditions.”353  She 
is referring to the bailout mechanism in the law—the process in place that 
enables a covered jurisdiction to “bail out” of preclearance by showing that 
it has complied with the Act for ten years.354  This feature of the law makes 
its burdens neither permanent nor overbroad.  By its very nature, the statute 
is designed to roll with the times. 
The ultimate irony of Shelby County, therefore, is that it reinvigorates 
an old idea of a constitutional shelf life in the context of a law that is a 
decidedly poor candidate for such a discussion. 
Conclusion 
When one poses a question in her title, a good reader will expect an 
answer.  Do laws have a constitutional shelf life?  Perhaps, but only under 
limited circumstances.  Granting courts this power to review statutes for 
staleness is a very risky endeavor in a world where facts are so easy to access 
and manipulate.  It is a mistake to think that investigating a law for stale facts 
is somehow a form of judicial modesty.  Shelby County purports to be modest, 
 
350. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(7) (2006); Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
351. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 2644. 
354. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006). 
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but is anything but.  The decision has breathed new life into an old idea of 
the constitutional shelf life without giving any guidance on its limits.  The 
consequences of Shelby County, I suspect, will reverberate way beyond the 
Voting Rights Act, and the conundrum it exemplifies is one we will be 
wrestling with for a long time to come. 
